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ABSTRACT
Richard Walther Darré joined the National Socialist German Workers Party in
1930 at the behest of Adolf Hitler and was Germany’s Reichsminister of Agriculture from
1933 to 1942. Darré was recruited by Hitler because of his Blood and Soil ideology. This
ideology was peasant-centric and argued that the German peasant embodied the ideal
racial form and pushed for a rebirth of German agriculture.
This thesis examines the career of Richard Walther Darré and focuses on two
questions: first, what role did Darré’s Blood and Soil ideology play in his rise and
removal from power; and, second, does Darré’s fall from power inform us about any
policies Hitler and NSDAP might have had about official’s removal from power?
I argue that Darré’s Blood and Soil ideology was responsible for both his rise and
fall from power. Darré was unable to navigate the political landscape that was the Third
Reich, and his devotion to his Blood and Soil ideology made it impossible for him to
properly administer German agriculture and peasant policy. 1938 marked a turning
point in Darré’s career. He split with his closest ally, Heinrich Himmler, and set himself
on the path to imminent demise. Despite Hitler’s push for conquest, Darré focused
inward on improving the existing peasantry within Germany through methods such as
biodynamic agriculture or through improved prices for agricultural goods to entice
peasants from leaving the countryside. Darré refused to change his policies as the

political and social landscape radically changed with World War II. Because of this he
was eventually fully removed from power in 1942.
In regard to personnel policy, I argue that all personnel decisions centered
around maintaining the party’s power. I examine party publications as well as Darré and
six other officials’ removals to draw this conclusion. Betrayal, scandal, and
incompetence were all leveraged by Hitler to preserve the party’s image during the
Third Reich.
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INTRODUCTION

Richard Walther Darré created the “Blood and Soil” ideology for the National
Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP). In its simplest form, the Blood and Soil
ideology argued that settled races were superior to nomadic races; the ideology was
peasant-centric, populist, and anti-urban. Darré applied this ideology to the German
peasantry and argued that through its racial purity and lack of spatial movement the
German peasantry embodied the ideal racial form. This ideology helped fuel Darré’s rise
from obscurity in 1930 to the leadership of agriculture for both the party and state in
1933. When Darré joined the NSDAP, it did not have a peasant program and was
desperate to diversify to garner more support.1 Darré was an experienced farmhand and
agricultural advisor who had been removed from his position as a Prussian agricultural
advisor in 1929. In 1928 and 1929, Darré wrote two books: Bauerntum als Lebensquell
der Nordischen Rasse and Neuadel aus Blut und Boden. 2 In these two books, Darré
outlined his ideology on settled persons, nomads, and the German nobility, which would
come to be known as Blood and Soil.

1

The peasantry refers, for the most part, to farmers and farmhands on small and
medium sized farms. It does not include the large estate farms that were found in
Prussia.
2 Richard Walther Darré, Bauerntum Als Lebensquell der Nordischen Rasse (Munich:
Lehmann, 1929); Richard Walther Darré, Neuadel aus Blut und Boden (Munich:
Lehmann, 1930).

2
The Blood and Soil ideology made Darré and, in turn, the NSDAP, popular with
the peasantry, a relatively large yet neglected social group.3 Darré rode this wave of
popularity to his promotion as Reichsminister of Agriculture in 1933. Shortly thereafter,
Darré became the Reich Peasant Leader and penned two hallmark pieces of legislation
to aid him in his quest to rebuild the German peasantry: The Hereditary Farm Law and
The Reich Food Estate Law. At the same time, Darré worked with Heinrich Himmler to
strengthen German racial stock within the Schutzstaffel (SS) through selective marriage
measures. Darré believed that by selectively breeding humans, as animals, traits could
be strengthened or eliminated over generations.
Darré had a strong start to his career in 1933 with a good harvest. In 1934 and
1935, however, saddled with poor harvests, peasant flight to urban jobs, and low food
prices, Darré’s weaknesses as an agricultural administrator became apparent, and in
1936 Herbert Backe became the head of the agricultural sector in the newly created
Office of the Four Year Plan. Herbert Backe was Darré’s deputy in multiple organizations
and was more technically minded than Darré. Backe and Darré coexisted for six years in
this situation. In the SS, Himmler and Darré’s working relationship would only last until
1938 when a disagreement in peasant policy led to Darré’s resignation from the Race
and Settlement Office (RuSHA). From 1938 to 1942, Darré slowly lost influence and

3

In 1933, agricultural laborers made up approximately 29% of the German population.
Found in J Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi
Economy (New York: Penguin USA, 2008), 167.
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power as Herbert Backe’s grew. In 1942, Darré was removed from his positions as
Reichsminister, Reichsleiter, and Reich Peasant Leader. 4 From 1942 to 1945, Darré lived
largely in obscurity and did not hold any official administrative positions. At the end of
the war, Darré turned himself in to the Americans and stood trial from 1947 to 1949. For
his role in the NSDAP and Hitler’s government Darré was sentenced to seven years’
imprisonment, but he was released in 1950. Darré died three years later, in 1953, from
liver cancer.
The career of Richard Walther Darré raises some important questions about the
NSDAP's handling of the Blood and Soil ideology, about Darré himself as a National
Socialist and high-ranking official, and how the NSDAP dealt with removing high-ranking
officials from power. More specifically, while the Blood and Soil ideology was integral to
the NSDAP’s rise to power, did the ideology maintain its importance by the late 1930s
and as World War II unfolded? Second, while the Blood and Soil ideology fueled Darré’s
rise to power, to what extent did it lead to his eventual loss of power in the government
and party? Third, how did Darré’s removal from power in 1942 compare to other
officials’ removal from power and, more specifically, did the NSDAP have any real
personnel policy that was applied in Darré’s case? The goal of this thesis is to examine

4

Reichsleiter was the second highest ranking position in the NSDAP, only subordinate to
the Führer, Adolf Hitler. Darré became a Reichsleiter in 1936 when his department in
the NSDAP was promoted to a Reichsamt.

4
these questions and, in particular, to examine Darré’s career after 1938, in which the
existing historiography on Darré is deficient.
Much of the historiography on Darré focuses on the first half of his career from
1930 to 1936, and it is generally in agreement on the main points. During this period,
Darré was recruited to National Socialism because of the NSDAP’s need for a peasant
program and because of Darré’s Blood and Soil ideology.5 Thereafter, he consolidated
his power and his ideology was massively popular with the peasantry. Third, Darré had
an impact on Heinrich Himmler’s peasant ideology, and they shared a friendship dating
back to the 1920s.6 Fourth, Darré was a champion of Gleichschaltung, and cemented his
position atop agriculture almost immediately after becoming Reichsminister.7 Finally,

Anna Bramwell, Blood and Soil: Richard Walther Darré́ and Hitler's Green Party
(Abbotsbrook, Bourne End, Buckinghamshire: Kensal Press, 1985), 77; E. M. Collingham,
The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food (New York: Penguin Books,
2013), 29; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 170; Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich in
Power (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 421; J. E. Farquharson, The Plough and the
Swastika: the NSDAP and Agriculture in Germany 1928-45 (London: Sage Publications,
1976), 17.
6 Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 228;
Collingham, The Taste of War, 30; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 171; Farquharson,
The Plough and the Swastika, 152-153; Bramwell, Blood and Soil, 90.
7 Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party 1933-1945 (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1973), 58; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 170; Evans, The Third
Reich in Power, 421; Farquharson, The Plough and the Swastika, 45; Bramwell, Blood
and Soil, 83-89.
Gleichschaltung literally translates to coordination or synchronization. It referred
to the coordination of all aspects of German government and life under the guise of
National Socialism.
5
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the agricultural sector in Germany faced a number of problems from 1933 to 1936, and
Darré and the Reich Food Estate were partially to blame for the agricultural failures.8
While there is general agreement on Darré’s career to 1936, there is a major
disagreement on the latter half of his career, specifically, on why and how he was
removed from power in 1942. For example, according to Dietrich Orlow, “As late as May
1942, the [Party Chancellery] and SS celebrated a joint victory: the de facto dismissal of
Walther Darré…” Thus, Orlow claims that Martin Bormann (Party) and Heinrich Himmler
(SS) cooperated in removing Darré from power simply so that they could replace him
with Herbert Backe.9 Lizzie Collingham states that Hitler replaced Darré with Backe to
“revitalize the war effort.”10 Adam Tooze argues that Darré was removed from power in
1942 because of a disastrous ration cut.11 J. E. Farquharson believes that Darré was
removed from power due to his implied unwillingness to exploit people that the NSDAP
found to be racially inferior, while his replacements, Himmler and Backe, were ‘in no
way opposed to exploitation of “inferior” peoples.’12 Farquharson also believes that
Darré’s falling out with Himmler played a critical role in his undoing.13 There is also the

8

Jonathan Harwood, “The Fate of Peasant-Friendly Plant Breeding in Nazi
Germany,” Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 40, no. 4 (2010): 575-576; Ian
Kershaw. Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 576-580; Collingham,
The Taste of War, 28-29; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 192-195; Farquharson, The
Plough and the Swastika, 168-171; Evans, The Third Reich in Power, 546-548.
9 Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party 1933-1945, 391.
10 Collingham, The Taste of War, 370.
11 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 543.
12 Farquharson, The Plough and the Swastika, 248.
13 Farquharson, The Plough and the Swastika, 248.
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opinion shared by Evans, Tooze, and Bramwell that Darré lasted as long as 1942 because
of “Hitler’s notorious reluctance to be seen to discard Ministers.”14 Finally, Anna
Bramwell makes the argument that Darré was removed from power because he was too
headstrong and devoted to his own ideas.15 This makes sense, and is part of the
argument that I will make, but one area where my analysis will differ from Bramwell’s is
in how she views Darré’s personality and his ideology. In sum, there is significant
divergence in the existing historiography on the reasons for Darré’s dismissal in 1942.
The goal of this thesis, especially, is to bring greater clarity to this issue.
In regard to the NSDAP’s personnel decisions, the historiography is fairly barren.
There were very few Reichsministers, and even fewer Reichsleiters, who were removed
from power. Each one of their cases seems to be unique, but there are two similarities
that can be drawn. As stated earlier, Hitler did not want to be seen as a leader who
discarded ministers.16 Also, Ian Kershaw argues that Hitler had to “save face as usual”
when removing high-ranking officials from power.17 Aside from these thoughts, there is
little specific information in the secondary literature in regard to how the NSDAP went

14

Quote found in Bramwell, Blood and Soil, 83; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 542;
Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich at War (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 40-42, 60.
15 Bramwell, Blood and Soil, 179.
16 See footnote 14.
17 Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1936-45: Nemesis (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 599.
This specific case is in reference to Wilhelm Frick who was the Reichsminister of the
Interior from 1933 until he was removed in 1942 and was then made the
Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia.
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about removing high-ranking officials from power. Through Darré’s case I hope to shed
further light on this issue.
The aforementioned secondary sources will provide much useful information for
this thesis; however, there are also important primary sources that I will utilize to
especially understand Darré’s career after 1936. First, there are Darré’s own writings.
Darré wrote often and authored a number of articles, books, speeches, and laws. His
two books will provide the basis of what Darré believed and what exactly his Blood and
Soil ideology entailed.18 Both of his hallmark laws give insight into how Darré attempted
to take his ideology and put it into practice.19 There are also multiple speeches, articles,
and other writings that I will use to get a picture of Darré’s opinions and ideas at specific
points in time.20

18

Darré, Bauerntum Als Lebensquell der Nordischen Rasse; Darré, Neuadel aus Blut und
Boden.
19 The complete Hereditary Farm Law including changes can be found at: Richard
Walther Darré, “Reichserbhofgesetz,” Verfassungen, accessed August 25,
2017, http://www.verfassungen.de/de/de33-45/reichserbhof33.htm; The complete
Reich Food Estate Law including changes can be found at: Richard Walther Darré,
“Gesetz über den vorläufigen Aufbau des Reichsnährstandes und Maßnahmen zur
Markt- und Preisregelung für landwirtschaftliche Erzeugnisse,” Verfassungen, accessed
August 25, 2017, http://www.verfassungen.de/de/de33-45/reichsnaehrstand33-2.htm.
20 Richard Walther Darré, Neuordnung unseres Denkens (Goslar: Verlag Blut und Boden,
1940); Richard Walther Darré, Vom Lebensgesetz Zweier Staatsgedanken (Goslar: Verlag
Blut und Boden, 1940); Richard Walther Darré, Um Blut und Boden (Munich:
Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Franz Eher Nachf, Gmbh, 1941); Richard Walther Darré, Blut
und Boden ein Grundgedanke des Nationalsozialismus (Berlin: Reichsdruckerei, 1936);
Oskar Just and Willrich Wolfgang, Nordisches Blutserbe im Süddeutschen Bauerntum
(Munich: Verlag F. Bruckman, 1938).
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Diaries will be another important source of information on Darré. Joseph
Goebbels mentions Darré multiple times, including the day Hitler dismissed him.21
Goebbels also provides insight into the political lives of most other high-ranking officials,
and I will use his diary to better understand the NSDAP’s personnel decisions. Helmuth
Groscurth sheds some light into Hermann Göring’s disdain of Darré. 22 Alfred Rosenberg
recalls Darré reflecting on his quarrels with Himmler. 23 Finally, Ulrich von Hassel
provides critical insight into Darré’s relationship with the peasantry in 1939. 24
I will also utilize a pair of memoirs written well after the end of National
Socialism. Hjalmar Schacht, a man with whom Darré quarreled during the better years
of both of their careers, explains what he believes Darré’s failures were. Schacht also
describes the process by which Hitler removed him (Schacht) from power.25 And Albert
Speer provides a top National Socialist’s opinion on Darré and his ideology.26
Some of Hitler’s personal beliefs from the mid-1920s from Mein Kampf will be of
use on the topic of personnel decisions. In a chapter on propaganda and organization,

21

Joseph Goebbels, Tagebücher 1924-1945 (Munich: Piper, 1999).
Helmuth Groscurth, Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938-1940 (Stuttgart: Deutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, 1970).
23 Alfred Rosenberg, The Political Diary of Alfred Rosenberg and the Onset of the
Holocaust, trans. Jürgen Matthäus and Frank Bajohr (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2015).
24 Ulrich von Hassel, The Von Hassell Diaries 1938-1944, trans. Allen Welsh Dulles
(Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1947).
25 Hjalmar Schacht, My First Seventy-Six Years, trans. Diana Pyke (London: Allan
Wingate, 1955).
26 Albert Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston
(New York: Macmillian Publishing Co., Inc., 1976).
22
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Hitler explained, on a very basic level, what the personnel policy of the NSDAP should
be, especially once it was in power.27 There are also a pair of collections of Hitler’s
transcribed war-time monologues that provide insight into Hitler’s personal thoughts on
others in the party.28
Lastly, the case record of the Ministries Trial by the American Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg provides unique insight into Darré’s opinions after the war, and it also
houses some documentary evidence that is not easily accessible elsewhere.29
Unfortunately, a number of personal documents belonging to Darré and his successor,
Herbert Backe, are inaccessible because of the protected nature of the archives in which
they are housed.
This thesis consists of three chapters. In chapter one, I explain Darré’s ideology
and the evolution of his career from 1930 to 1938. This includes the development of his
ideology before joining the party and how he attempted to practically apply his ideology
through legislation. I explain how he became a Reichsminister, Reichsleiter, and the

27

Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971),
584.
28 Adolf Hitler, Table Talk 1941-1944, trans. H R Trevor-Roper (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1953); Adolf Hitler, Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941/1942
(Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1965).
29 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunal, vol. 12, “The Ministries
Case” (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952); Trials of War Criminals
Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunal, vol. 13, “The Ministries Case” (Washington D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952); Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg
Military Tribunal, vol. 14, “The Ministries Case” (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1952).
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head of the RuSHA. I also explore a number of problems that he faced from 1936 to
1938. This provides the groundwork for the essential second chapter in which I explain
Darré’s undoing.
In chapter two, I lay out my own research on Darré’s demise, and how it was
rooted in his peasant ideology, Blood and Soil. I argue that there were a number of
ancillary factors connected to this demise, but Blood and Soil was deeply implicated in
all of them: Darré’s loss of influence in peasant matters, Landflucht30, the decline in
Darré’s popularity with the peasantry, and Darré’s deteriorating relationships with other
high-ranking government and NSDAP officials. The accumulating effect of these factors,
inflected as they were with Darré’s insistence on sticking to Blood and Soil and
underpinned by his administrative incompetence, led to Darré’s increasing
marginalization after he left the RuSHA in 1938, and it culminated in his eventual total
loss of power in 1942. Lastly, I discuss Darré’s life after 1942 until his death in 1953.
In chapter three, I explain how the fundamental principle of NSDAP personnel
policy was to protect the party image at all costs. To explain this policy, I use two main
methods of research. First, I use statements about personnel policy made in Mein
Kampf and the Organisationsbuch der NSDAP. Second, I examine six separate officials to
explain how there were three main reasons that the NSDAP used to remove officials
from power: treason and betrayal, scandal and the preservation of party image, and

30

Landflucht literally translates to land flight. It refers to agricultural workers leaving
farms and moving to the cities for better wages.
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ineffectiveness and incompetence. Lastly, I explain how Darré’s case fits into this
personnel policy.

12
CHAPTER 1

Richard Walther Darré was one of several foreign-born Germans who found a
place in the NSDAP. Darré was born on July 14, 1895 in Buenos Aires, Argentina to an
ethnic German family. He attended a German school in Belgrano until he was ten, but
then moved to Germany to continue his education in Heidelberg and later in Godesberg.
From 1911 to 1913, Darré studied as an exchange student at King’s College in
Wimbledon, England, but by April 1914 Darré began studying agriculture at the Colonial
School in Witzenhausen with hopes of returning to Argentina as a farmer. However, this
would never transpire; three months later he left school to join the German military.1
Darré’s military career lasted the duration of the First World War and was served
entirely on the Western Front. Darré served in thirty separate battles at the front and
achieved the rank of Second Lieutenant and earned the Iron Cross Second Class. After
World War I, Darré resumed his studies at the Colonial School in Witzenhausen with a
new desire to pursue a career in agronomy within the Reich.2 In 1920 Darré completed
his studies in Witzenhausen, and in 1922 began studying agronomy at the University in
Halle. During his tenure at Halle he had a practicum in animal research, and after he

1

Hermann Reischle, Reichsbauernführer Darré (Berlin: Verlag und Vertriebsgesellschaft,
1935), 16.
2 Reischle, Reichsbauernführer Darré, 27.

13
finished his studies at Halle in 1925 he began unpaid work for the horse-breeding firm
Trakhener Stud in 1926.
Darré became an active writer following his time at Halle publishing fourteen
articles on plant and animal breeding from 1925 to 1927. In 1926, Darré released one of
his most famous articles “Das Schwein als Kriterium für nordische Völker und Semiten”
in which he first laid forth his theory on settled races and nomads which would later be
the basis of his Blood and Soil ideology. In the article, Darré explained that to properly
rear domestic pigs, a person had to be rooted to one area because the domestic pig is
not capable of living a highly mobile, or nomadic, lifestyle.3 Darré argued that Jews’
aversion to pork stemmed from the fact that they were nomadic and for this reason
were incapable of rearing pigs.4 Therefore, Darré’s main argument was, “The domestic
pig gives us clear evidence that Nordic peoples were settled races and that Jews’
rejection of that same animal proves their nomadism just as clearly.”5
In 1928 Darré became an expert agricultural advisor for the East Prussian
Ministry of Agriculture. During his tenure in this position Darré gained an understanding
of how the German agricultural bureaucracy worked. In the same year Darré began
work on his masterpiece, Bauerntum als Lebensquell der Nordischen Rasse, that would
be released in December 1928. In Bauerntum Darré expanded and elaborated on his

3

Richard Walther Darré, Das Schwein als Kriterium für nordische Völker und Semiten
(Munich: Lehmann, 1933), 8-9.
4 Darré, Das Schwein, 8.
5 Darré, Das Schwein, 15.
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ideas regarding settled races and nomads that he had begun in “Das Schwein”. Darré
argued that Germans are a settled race by nature whose culture has been developed by
its peasantry and their connection and influence on the land where they have been
settled. The settled race’s antithesis is a nomadic race whose culture is entirely
“subordinate to their environment because of their parasitic nature.”6 Aside from Jews,
Darré also named Muslims and the Chinese as examples of nomadic races.7 Darré
believed that a settled race’s blood was pure because its kinsmen would only mate with
their kinsmen, thereby preserving their cultural and racial integrity; in contrast, Darré
believed that nomadic races spread their influence through blood by mating with settled
races that they would encounter during their travels, thereby tainting the purity of the
offspring’s blood.8 This ideology that placed settled races and, specifically, the peasantry
at the center of cultural and racial life was Blood and Soil.
In 1929 Darré lost his position with the East Prussian Ministry of Agriculture due
to arguments over seed quality with ministry officials in Berlin.9 Around this same time
Darré began working on his second book, Neuadel aus Blut und Boden, which was
published in 1930. In Neuadel Darré explained how Germany could create a new
peasant-based nobility using his Blood and Soil ideology. Darré believed that the old

6

Richard Walther Darré, Das Bauerntum Als Lebensquell der Nordischen Rasse (Munich:
Lehmann, 1929), 47.
7 Darré, Bauerntum, 17.
8 Darré, Bauerntum, 17.
9 Anna Bramwell, Blood and Soil: Richard Walther Darré and Hitler's Green Party
(Abbotsbrook, Bourne End, Buckinghamshire: Kensal Press, 1985), 30-31.
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nobility had been tainted by Christianity and Greco-Roman culture and had become
nothing more than a name poisoned by foreign influences where one’s blood no longer
mattered.10 Darré argued that any Syrian could have a German noble title, and as long
as others accepted him, he would be part of the German nobility.11 Because of this, a
new nobility was necessary, one that was title-less and contained solely German
blood.12 Darré believed that the new nobility would have to be composed of people who
could sustain and continuously renew the German blood line.13 Darré also invoked the
Indo-Germans who, according to him, viewed anybody who owned their own house as
nobility.14 This was too broad a definition in 1930 though and Darré believed it should
be narrowed to only include landholders.15 These two conditions -those of German
blood and landholders- were the criteria of Darré’s Blood and Soil ideology and,
therefore, the peasantry ought to be the source of Germany’s new nobility.16
Darré the National Socialist
Darré was unknown before Bauerntum.17 After its publication he started to
become known in völkisch and racialist circles, which led to Darré’s involvement with

10

Richard Walther Darré, Neuadel aus Blut und Boden (Munich: Lehmann, 1930), 23-25.
Richard Walther Darré, Um Blut und Boden: Reden und Aufsätze (Munich:
Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Franz Eher Nachf, 1941), 41.
12 Darré, Um Blut und Boden, 52-54.
13 Darré, Neuadel, 40.
14 Darré uses the term Indogermanen as a blanket term to describe early Germanic
people.
15 Darré, Neuadel, 41.
16 Darré, Neuadel, 41-42.
17 Darré, Schwein, Publisher’s Notes 1.
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the NSDAP and eventual recruitment in June 1930.18 Hitler was particularly interested in
Darré’s peasant ideology and, according to Darré’s first biographer, Hermann Reischle,
Hitler was willing to offer Darré a position within the NSDAP that allowed him free reign
in peasant policy.19
In 1930 Darré also joined the Schutzstaffel (SS). Darré and Himmler had
developed a relationship in the 1920s due to their mutual membership in the Artaman
League and Himmler’s interest in Darré’s early Blood and Soil ideas.20 Darré had taught
Himmler that the peasantry was the only reliable source for pure German blood and it
was therefore necessary for the state to protect and nurture the peasantry. 21 When
Darré joined the NSDAP he and Himmler naturally gravitated toward each other.22 In
1932, Himmler made Darré the head of the newly created SS Race and Settlement Office
(RuSHA).23 The purpose of this office was initially to oversee racial matters within the SS,
specifically issuing marriage licenses to SS-men allowing them to marry pure blooded
women and investigating the racial background of SS-enrollees, and was eventually

18

Bramwell, Blood and Soil, 75-77.
Reischle, Reichsbauernführer Darré, 48.
20 Michael Kater, Weimar: From Enlightenment to the Present (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2014), 182-183.
The Artaman League was an interwar völkisch-agrarian group that was eventually
absorbed by the NSDAP.
21 Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head: The Story of Hitler’s SS, trans. Richard
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supposed to turn into an office which helped place SS-men on vacant agricultural
landholdings.
Germany’s agricultural community was quite large, accounting for approximately
29% of the German population, and faced issues such as poor harvests and an overreliance on imports to meet food needs.24 Despite this they were largely ignored on the
political stage.25 Darré and the NSDAP capitalized on this by creating a strong
Agricultural Administration within the NSDAP that was stocked with field specialists who
injected its influence into the smaller agricultural organizations throughout Germany. 26
While addressing the peasantry at this time Darré’s speeches had a couple main
themes: the peasantry formed the basis of the German race and the peasantry was
going to be an integral part of the NSDAP’s new world order.27 During this period, Darré
was extremely effective at rabble-rousing while strengthening his personal power base,
much as Hitler had done in the years prior.
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This success in penetrating the agricultural sector translated into votes for the
NSDAP and to a growth in control of the Reichstag. In the 1930 Reichstag election, the
NSDAP went from being the ninth largest party in the Reichstag to the second. Darré
earned himself one of the NSDAP’s 107 seats. In 1932, the NSDAP became the largest
party in the Reichstag with 230 of the 608 total seats. Despite these successes, the
NSDAP did not yet hold a majority of the seats in the Reichstag and were therefore
unable to unilaterally pursue its political agenda on a national scale. However, on
January 30, 1933 President Paul von Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler Chancellor and
the NSDAP earned its first Cabinet seats.28 This would soon allow the NSDAP and Darré
to truly pursue their goals. The NSDAP’s good fortune would continue when the
Reichstag burned on the night of February 27/28, giving Hitler the chance to convince
Hindenburg to pass the Reichstag Fire Decree, which suspended some of the liberties
afforded to German citizens in the German Constitution.29 The NSDAP used this power
to arrest multiple communists, including all the Communist delegates in the Reichstag.
On March 5, 1933 new Reichstag elections were held and the NSDAP received
forty-four percent of the vote. With this new power, and with the silencing of the
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Communists who had twelve percent of the seats in the Reichstag, the NSDAP was able
to easily pass the Enabling Act of 1933. This law allowed Hitler and his cabinet to enact
laws with no involvement of the Reichstag, effectively ending the democratic process in
Germany. Hitler was almost the supreme ruler of Germany; the only man who stood in
his way was the aging President Paul von Hindenburg. The issue for Hitler was that
Hindenburg had the complete support of the German military and was beloved by the
population. Therefore, overthrowing the President was not an option; instead, Hitler
simply had to wait for the aging and ailing Hindenburg to die.
Hitler and the NSDAP’s successes did not immediately translate to success for
Darré. When Hitler became Chancellor, Alfred Hugenberg was appointed as the Minister
of Agriculture and the Minister of Economics. In May 1933 Darré was given the new title
of Reich Peasant Leader, but that position was at the time relegated to a special title
within the NSDAP. Then a smear campaign by the NSDAP and Hugenberg’s vocal belief
that the German economy could be saved through colonization led to his forced
resignation on June 29, 1933.30
Darré the Minister 1933-1935
Five months after Hitler became Chancellor, Darré was appointed Minister of
Agriculture. Darré acted quickly to impose Gleichschaltung and restructure the politics
of the Ministry of Agriculture to fall in line with his Blood and Soil ideology. Shortly after
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assuming office, on September 13, 1933 the Reich Food Estate (RNS) was established as
the authority to manage the agricultural supply chain, and Darré, as Reich Peasant
Leader, became its head. The RNS was an autonomous organization that was not part of
the NSDAP nor part of the German government. The role of the RNS was to “regulate
the production, distribution, as well as the prices and price margins of agricultural
produce when it appears desirable, having taken into consideration the interests of the
economy and of the common good.”31 Therefore, the purpose of the RNS was to create
a planned agricultural economy that was isolated, and therefore protected, from the
world market. The RNS’s role, consistent with the Blood and Soil ideology, was to create
economic protections and plans that would help protect and nurture the peasant class.
In 1934 the Market Order of the RNS was issued. Darré’s biographer, Hermann
Reischle, states that the Market Order’s intent “was to destroy agrarian capitalism,” and
according to Gustav Corni, the goals of the Market Order were to create
governmental:
•
•
•
•
•
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Oversight of Demand and Production,
Alignment of production to demand and the adjustment of consumption with
production capacity,
Control of production at the demand sites,
Elimination of disturbances in the market, especially through import control and
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In short, the Market Order took the issues with which the RNS was already dealing and
created specific goals in hopes of spearheading these issues to promote, and eventually
achieve, agricultural autarky. In fall 1934 Darré and his deputy, Herbert Backe, laid forth
another plan to help achieve autarky called the Battle for Production. They believed that
to achieve autarky the German peasant needed to become more technologically
advanced. Peasants in 1930s Germany were still operating like peasants in the 19th
century, with many still tending their fields completely by hand because they were
unable to afford powered equipment.33 The goal of the Battle for Production was to
increase German efficiency and self-sufficiency through farmer education and by
subsidizing modern farm equipment.34
On September 29th, 1933 Darré signed the Reich Hereditary Farm Law. The Reich
Hereditary Farm Law created legal protections for farmers and a class system within the
agricultural community. The law stated that:
•

•
•
•
•
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not exceeding 125 hectares are Hereditary Farms if they belong to
someone capable of farming.
The owner of the Hereditary Farm is a Hereditary Farmer.
Hereditary Farmers can only be one who is a German citizen, German or
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The family farm will not be divided when inherited
The rights of the co-heirs are limited to the assets of the farmer. Those
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offer; in case of emergency, home refuge is guaranteed.
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•
•

The Impartible Inheritance cannot be excluded or limited by legal will.
The family farm is in principle inalienable and unsellable.35

This law created one inheritance law for Germany which put an end to the multiple
inheritance traditions left over from the highly fragmented Holy Roman Empire. It also
created debt protections for farmers making it impossible for a debt collector to seize a
farmer’s land as payment for a loan. The law also divided farmers into two classes:
Hereditary Farmers (Bauern) and standard Farmers (Landwirte).36 The Hereditary Farm
was Darré’s ideal because it embodied Blood and Soil. Only farmers with pure blood
could become Hereditary Farmers, and their farms were what Darré considered an ideal
size for a peasant. They were legally bound to the land, so their blood, and culture,
would forcibly remain pure and they would spiritually create a connection with the soil
through generations because they could not legally sell their farm. Anyone who did not
fit this mold, such as Prussian estate farmers or families with small farms, would be
considered standard farmers. Standard Farmers either did not have large enough plots
to really be considered peasants, or their landholdings were so large that they were
more than likely members of the Prussian nobility and therefore tainted stock per
Darré’s argument in Neuadel. The Hereditary farm was Darré’s attempt at forcibly
creating his peasant nobility envisioned in Neuadel.
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Darré also furthered his racial work within the SS. In 1934 Darré was promoted
to the highest rank in the SS at the time, Obergruppenführer, and in 1935 Darré joined
the Lebensborn program, a subdivision of the RuSHA, which at that time was a family
planning service for the wives of SS men. The program also helped unmarried women
who were deemed racially valuable and assisted them in either raising their children or
placing their children for adoption. By the time the SS Seniority List was released in
January 1936, Darré had reached his maximum position within the SS. Darré had
achieved the rank of Obergruppenführer and had received the Honor Ring and Honor
Dagger, personal gifts from Himmler that were only given to certain SS officers.37
The special position that farmers held during this period was shown in an annual
propaganda event created in 1933 called the Reich Harvest Festival. Many of the
NSDAP’s elite attended, and Hitler and Darré, among others, would address the
peasantry directly. This festival was the largest event on the NSDAP’s calendar edging
out even the Nuremberg Party Rallies.38 In its inaugural year, the Reich Harvest Festival
had an attendance of 500,000, and by 1937 was attended by 1.2 million.39
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Competition and Conflict 1935-1938
Darré’s inabilities as a politician and administrator became clear as his time in
office went on, and Joseph Goebbels’ diary is a strong source for this claim. Goebbels
was privately very critical of Darré and his criticism grew over the years. For example,
early in Darré’s career as a minister, in January 1934, Goebbels wrote that “Darré makes
up nonsense about nonsense. What an Idiot!”40 In August 1935 Goebbels wrote, “I
spoke with Darré about inflation. He believes that Goerdeler is his enemy. How naive!”41
Later that month Goebbels wrote, “Darré needs to focus on food or Goerdeler will be
coming after him,” and, “Spoke with the Führer about overpricing. Goerdeler should be
utilized because Darré still hasn’t figured it out.”42 In November 1935 Goebbels wrote
that at a meeting of Party officials there were many complaints about Darré and the
RNS.43 In February 1938 Goebbels stated, “Labor shortages are becoming critical.
Radical measures are being considered. Darré isn’t doing enough, he is too busy
organizing.”44 Goebbels opinion of Darré was clearly negative, but there is a key change
that is noticeable as time goes on. The first few times that Goebbels mentions Darré in
1932 and 1933 his opinion is neutral, simply mentioning that he had spoken with Darré
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on the phone or mentioning him in the lists of who would be given cabinet positions
should Hitler be made Chancellor.45 By 1934, however, almost every single time
Goebbels mentions Darré it is a complaint or negative comment. Furthermore, Goebbels
comments beginning in 1935 show an increasing urgency to have other officials deal
with Darré’s shortcomings. Goebbels was not alone in his criticism; there were many
others who also argued that Darré was not performing to expectation; the following
section will deal with this issue, and some of the problems Darré faced from 1935 to
1938.
In 1933 Germany had a strong harvest with above average yields in several key
crops, such as wheat, rye, barley, oats, and sugar beets. In 1934 this high quickly came
to an end, however, with large drops in the yields of grains (20% drop in wheat and oat
yield).46 In 1935 these yields continued to drop, which caused Darré’s first tangible
opposition within the party and government. The Minister of Economics, Hjalmar
Schacht, was in control of Germany’s foreign currency, which in the winter of 1935/1936
was being funneled into heavy industry to fuel German rearmament. For fear of having
a grain deficit during the winter Darré requested foreign currency for the import of grain
to cover the expected deficits; Schacht refused Darré’s request. Darré was therefore
forced to request Hitler’s aid in securing the foreign currency. Hitler appointed Hermann
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Göring to take charge of the foreign currency situation. Paul Körner explained the
situation during his post-war trial in Nuremberg:47
As far as I was concerned, the entire economic sphere came into being
for the first time when Göring, in the conflict between Schacht and Darré,
was appointed to procure for Darré the necessary foreign exchange to
cover the expenses of the quantities of grain that had to be purchased
abroad. This conflict was the first precursor, which ultimately led to the
creation of the Four Year Plan. At that time, in the preceding years of
1934 and 1935, Germany had had actually two very bad harvests, and did
not have sufficient quantities of bread grain available to feed the
population. The shortage amounted to approximately 2 million tons, as
compared to a yearly consumption figure for the old Reich of
approximately 12 million tons of bread grain. The question was either to
import the short quantity in grain or introduce rationing in peacetime.
Hitler and Darré were against any rationing and Darré asked that Schacht
furnish the necessary foreign exchange in order to be able to purchase
the necessary bread grain abroad. Schacht refused and stated that he had
no foreign exchange available which might permit him to make that
available to Darré for these purposes.48
The foreign currency was finally allocated, but the situation stressed the symbiotic
relationship between Schacht and Darré, the ministers of Economy and Agriculture,
whose governmental roles were often intertwined. Unfortunately for Darré and
Germany, this trend of poor yields would continue for the majority of harvests until
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1938, when they finally rebounded to 1933 levels after four consecutive downward
trending harvests.49
According to Paul Körner, the row between Darré and Schacht had far reaching
consequences for both men. The main consequence was the creation of the Office of
the Four Year Plan in 1936. This was an economic organization whose purpose was to
have Germany war-ready by 1940. Hermann Göring was placed in charge of this
organization and was made the plenipotentiary of the German economy. Göring’s new
place as plenipotentiary made Darré subordinate to him which was a blow to Darré’s
authority. To make matters worse, Darré’s deputy, Herbert Backe, was made the head
of the agricultural sector in this new rival organization. This position made Backe a
”second Minister of Agriculture”50 under the leadership of Göring. Darré was no longer
the sole force in agricultural policy, but rather was in constant competition with Backe
and the Office of the Four Year Plan.
The German Labor Front (DAF) was another organization that encroached on
Darré’s authority during this period. The DAF was the party-run organization that
replaced all labor unions when Hitler came to power. One of the DAF’s major programs
was Kraft durch Freude, a program which made vacations, leisure facilities, and
automobiles available to the average worker. In 1935 the DAF, led by Robert Ley, began
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encroaching on the RNS because Ley wanted agricultural workers, who were
administered solely by the RNS, to fall within the sphere of the DAF. The issue was
quickly resolved, however, in the Bückeberger Agreement, which allowed the RNS to
retain authority over agricultural workers but gave farmers access to DAF programs.51
This agreement did not last, however, and in 1937 Ley began encroaching on the RNS
again. The DAF once again began to seek representation and administration in the
agricultural sector where the RNS was supposed to be the sole governing body. Darré
brought this issue to Hitler’s Secretary, Rudolf Hess, stating that the DAF was attempting
to mimic services that the RNS already offered under the guise of the DAF, so much so,
that farmers could not understand why they were being administered by two different
bodies.52 Ley wanted the RNS dissolved entirely and told Darré that the DAF was only
intervening in areas where the RNS was not performing.53 Despite continued complaints
by Darré, nothing was done to clearly define the boundaries of the DAF and the RNS.
In 1936, the Agra-Political Office of the NSDAP was promoted to a Reichsamt and
Darré, therefore, became a full-fledged Reichsleiter.54 On paper, this should have been a
promotion for Darré, but this move simply gave Darré a new title and stripped the RNS
of some of its autonomy. This is shown by one of the new duties of the Reichsamt:
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indirect supervision of the RNS.55 The organizational chart found in Ley’s 1937
Organisationsbuch der NSDAP shows this, as well as how each office/position in the
Reichsamt compared to its contemporary within the RNS.56 In sum, the RNS became
more subordinate to the party, and though Darré was still in charge of the Reichsamt, it
allowed the party to have greater influence in RNS matters.
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The RNS also faced internal issues. In 1936 Darré tore his Achilles tendon and
took six months off, leaving his duties in the RNS to a circle of lower officials. This
created a power vacuum, and an RNS official named Wilhelm Meinberg attempted to
take advantage of the situation.57 Meinberg was a rival of Backe but was far less
successful. Despite this, he had gained his own group of followers who planned to
overthrow Darré as Reich Peasant Leader.58 On March 26, 1937 Darré was made privy to
what was happening with Meinberg, and on the next day removed Meinberg from his
post.59 The issue did not end there, however. Meinberg went to Berlin and confronted
Walter Granzow and Hermann Göring with the matter.60 Granzow’s solution was to
completely reassign Darré, give Backe the Ministry of Agriculture, and give Meinberg the
RNS.61 The fact that anyone would even consider punishing Darré so heavily for
something so minor goes to show how negatively some people within the party viewed
him. This problem eventually made its way up to a three-way consultation between
Göring, Himmler, and Hitler. The solution was that Darré would retain all of his positions
and Meinberg would work for Göring in the Office of the Four Year Plan. 62 Despite
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winning this particular battle, overall, it was a loss for Darré. JE Farquharson argues that,
“[Darré’s] prestige suffered a further blow with the row over Meinberg in early 1937,
when he stated that only through a ‘superhuman effort’ had he been able to win back
the Führer’s confidence.”63
The Hereditary Farm Law became an issue for some regional administrators by
1937 because some Hereditary Farmers took advantage of the increased protection
offered to them by the Hereditary Farm Law to the detriment of the country. In East
Prussia, for example, the problem was especially apparent through farmers who were
incapable of caring for their own farms, but who were unable or unwilling to transfer
title to someone else, to farmers who openly refused to increase production because
their harvests were large enough for them.64 Gauleiter of East Prussia, Erich Koch,
believed that there were at least one or two bad Hereditary Farms per village that
created a bad example for all other farms in that area. This created headaches for the
RNS because they had to focus extra resources on administration and removing
inefficient and incompetent Hereditary Farmers from their land.65 On top of that,
competent farmers who wanted to transfer title of their farm in a non-hereditary
manner faced immense difficulty due to the rules of the Hereditary Farm Law.
Therefore, on December 23, 1938 the Hereditary Farm Law was reissued so that in cases
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of “special hardships” titles of Hereditary Farms could be transferred non-hereditarily.66
It was apparent that creating a new peasant-based nobility was going to be far more
difficult than passing a few laws.
Trumping all other issues already mentioned, the greatest of this period was
Landflucht. This flight from the land was caused by the unregulated wages of cityworkers being higher than the regulated wages of farmers in the countryside. 67 Adolf
Hitler and Hermann Göring favored industry and urban workers because they were
rearming Germany; therefore, they wanted food prices to remain low to reduce the cost
of living in cities. This caused farmers’ wages to decrease because they were unable to
charge more for their goods. Prices for agricultural products were set by the RNS and
farmers were not allowed to charge differently unless they illegally sold their goods on
the black market. Many farmers simply gave up on agriculture and moved to the cities
for a higher standard of living. From 1933 to 1938, the number of farm laborers dropped
by 21 per cent and white-collar workers increased by 26 percent.68 This caused massive
agricultural labor shortages because there were fewer farm laborers who were,
nevertheless, required to produce an ever-increasing amount of food for the cities.
Adam Tooze described the labor situation as such:
Above all, there was alarm in RNS circles about the way in which farming families
were responding to the labour shortage. Farm women were the most
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overworked group in the rural population and reducing the number of children
was the most obvious way to cut their work burden. In Niedersachsen, the very
heartland of the German peasantry, the number of children per couple had
fallen by as much as 33 per cent in a single generation. At the same time the
labour shortage was also threatening the efforts of the RNS to raise domestic
production. Already in 1937 the harvest had borne all the hallmarks of an
emergency ‘Aktion’. The regular farm workforce had had to be supported by
Labour Front draftees, soldiers, convicts, and schoolchildren.69
From 1938 on labor shortages were a constant problem for Darré. In 1938 Darré figured
that the undervaluation of agricultural labor was at a staggering minimum of 25 percent,
meaning that farmers were only earning 75 percent of what they should.70 Farm
laborers faced a simple choice, stay in the countryside and earn less than one was
worth, or move to the cities and earn more.
Summary
Darré was a massively powerful and popular figure from 1930 to 1935. He
launched himself through the party, government, and SS achieving tops ranks in each of
these groups. His acumen regarding organizing the peasantry was astounding, and he
was able to firmly place himself atop this group that encompassed approximately one
quarter of the German population by 1933. He attempted to quickly realize his Blood
and Soil ideology by top-down control of German agriculture. Despite early success in
1933, Darré faced mostly failures from 1934 to 1938. Darré was charismatic and
talented at galvanizing the peasantry, but when it came to actual administration of
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German agriculture Darré showed little shrewdness. Even Darré’s greatest successes,
the Hereditary Farm Law and Reich Food Estate, became failures. Regardless of Darré’s
intentions, he could not force Hereditary Farmers to set a good example, he could not
force Göring to increase food prices in the city, and he could not stop the everincreasing encroachments on his autonomy. Despite numerous incursions on Darré and
his authority, he was still a Reichsleiter, Minister, the Reich Peasant Leader, SSObergruppenführer, and head of the RuSHA. Regardless of his failures and the very real
dislike of Darré by many in the party leadership, the only attempts to remove Darré
were petty and snubbed by Hitler and Himmler. The appearance of party unity and the
appearance of complete control and efficiency were more important to Hitler and
Himmler than anything else. At this time Hitler was content leaving Darré in all of his
positions while allowing other actors to assert their influence in the agricultural sector.
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CHAPTER 2

1938 marked a definitive turning point in Darré’s career. Hitler and the NSDAP
began to focus considerably more on foreign policy as both Austria and the Sudetenland
were annexed by the Reich in March and September respectively. War quickly
approached as Germany occupied Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, creating a socalled “protectorate” and establishing a pro-German independent Slovakia. Germany
then invaded Poland on September 1, 1939 and World War II began. By 1942 it was
clear to the NSDAP that Darré’s vision of a self-sufficient peasant-centric Germany could
not become reality and, eventually, in May 1942 Hitler removed Darré from his positions
as Reichsminister and Reichsleiter. Following Darré’s removal he lived a relatively quiet
life until he surrendered to American forces in mid-April 1945 several weeks before the
war’s end in Europe.
Darré’s loss of power in party and state was preceded by his voluntary
resignation from the RuSHA in February 1938. Darré and Himmler had been close
friends until at least mid-1937, but Himmler began encroaching on Darré’s authority in
peasant and settlement matters. Darré had little effect on settlement through the
RuSHA and legitimate settlement efforts never really took place until after Darré had
already resigned.1 Peter Longerich described the time after Darré’s resignation ‘as a
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chance to shift the emphasis in the expansion of the SS empire from the concept of the
“state protection corps” to “Lebensraum policy”.’2 Darré’s disappointment with
Himmler’s encroachment was so great that he actually tried to resign entirely from the
SS, though Hitler snubbed this idea.3 Darré’s falling out with Himmler, one of his closest
allies, is a main theme of the second half of Darré’s career. This split indicates that the
party was moving away from Blood and Soil and was shifting the agricultural ideological
sphere into Himmler and Backe’s hands.
This chapter addresses two main questions: How did the status of the Blood and
Soil ideology change after 1938, and why was Darré removed from power in 1942? The
break between Darré and Himmler, Darré’s loss of popularity with the peasantry,
Landflucht, and the war all played critical roles in the decline of Darré and the Blood and
Soil ideology. I will rely on diaries, memoirs, and conversations of multiple high-ranking
officials to give insight into Darré’s image and that of his ideology. I will also rely on the
yearly statistics books released by the German Government to explain quantitatively
why and how Darré, agriculture, and the peasantry as agricultural producers failed over
time.
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Darré and Himmler
The deterioration of Darré and Himmler’s relationship was extremely damaging
for Darré because Himmler had staunchly defended and supported Darré in years past.
Darré recalled to Alfred Rosenberg in May 1940 that ‘He and H[immler] were both weak
at first. They pooled their resources and are now strong. There is nothing but outright
power, as well as a forging of internal alliance. . . Now Darré had built up his Race and
Settlement Office for Himmler. Then H[immler], always with the Führer as chief of
police, no longer needed Darré and “removed” him.’4 It appears that although Darré had
voluntarily resigned from the RuSHA, he believed that his hand was forced by Himmler’s
will to throw him aside to strengthen his own political position.
Darré and Himmler’s falling out revolved around their contending philosophies
regarding the future of the peasantry. One of Darré’s main points of contention with
Himmler surrounded the Wehrbauer, or a soldier-peasant. Hitler was drawn to the
concept of the Wehrbauer, and in July 1941 Hitler spoke of his vision of Wehrbauer
colonists:
We'll take the Southern part of the Ukraine, especially the Crimea, and make it
an exclusively German colony. There'll be no harm in pushing out the population
that's there now. The German colonist will be the [Wehrbauer], and for that I'll
take professional soldiers, whatever their line may have been previously. In this
way we shall dispose, moreover, of a body of courageous [officers], whenever
we need them. In the future we shall have a standing army of a million and a half
to two million men. With the discharge of soldiers after twelve years of Service,
4
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we shall have thirty to forty thousand men to do what we like with every year.
For those of them who are sons of peasants, the Reich will put at their disposal a
completely equipped farm. The soil costs us nothing, we have only the house to
build. The peasant's son will already have paid for it by his twelve years' Service.
During the last two years he will already be equipping himself for agriculture.
One single condition will be imposed upon him: that he may not marry a
townswoman, but a countrywoman who, as far as possible, will not have begun
to live in a town with him. These soldier- peasants will be given arms, so that at
the slightest danger they can be at their posts when we summon them. That's
how the ancient Austria used to keep its Eastern peoples under control. By the
same token, the soldier-peasant will make preschool teacher. The [officer] is an
ideal teacher for the little country-boy. In any case, this [officer] will make a
better teacher than our present teacher will make an officer! Thus, we shall
again find in the countryside the blessing of numerous families. Whereas the
present law of rural inheritance dispossesses the younger sons, in the future
every peasant's son will be sure of having his patch of ground. And thirty to forty
thousand peasants a year — that's enormous!5
By 1941, Hitler had decided that the creation of soldiers was of the utmost importance
in his future German state, and that the peasantry would be created from these
soldiers. Hitler wanted twelve of the most formative years of a peasant’s life to be
devoted to the military rather than having someone live a peasant’s life entirely. Hitler
and Himmler’s visions for eastern settlement were similar, but what exactly set their
vision apart from Darré’s?
The greatest difference was that Darré’s main focus was reorganization and
promotion of the peasantry within the Reich, and resettlement to conquered territories
was secondary. For Himmler and Hitler, however, the primary focus was the
colonization of conquered territories by armed peasants who would spread SS influence
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into the borderlands. On October 24, 1940 Himmler explained his vision about land
acquisition for German resettlement to the civil administration of the newly acquired
territory of Posen:
We don’t need to buy the land for settlement; settlement land already exists […].
Polish workers must provide the cheap labour for settlement and for ploughing
the fields […] The Germans will always provide the leadership for everything; the
Poles will do the dirty work […] If there is no more land to be distributed then, as
is always the case throughout history, new land will have to be got with the
sword.
Himmler also explained that SS-men were already placing money into a compulsory
savings account that would be used to fund their colonization of the eastern territories.6
In summary, Himmler’s idea was that SS-men, regardless of past farming
acumen, were to use their savings to move to the borderlands where they would join a
hybrid peasant military community. While trying to properly run a farm, they were
expected to defend the German borders from any invader or uprising. When these
farmers had children, all of the children were to be entitled to land, and if there was no
land to give them, they should conquer more land for settlement.
This plan is clearly full of logistical holes. Farming is a science and to expect
people to successfully farm foreign soil in varying climates is highly impractical. Land is
finite as well, and at some point, there would be no land available for conquest for new
peasants. On top of these issues, there was also the fact that Landflucht was still a major
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problem. There was no foreseeable reason why people would want to leave Germany to
farm in the newly conquered territories when population and new settlement figures
had been steadily dropping since 1933.7 The NSDAP’s economic vision for the
Generalplan Ost further shows how out of touch the vision of the Wehrbauer was from
the reality of the past seven years of National Socialist leadership.8 The NSDAP
envisioned that thirty-five percent of the population that would settle in the conquered
Eastern Territories would be involved in agriculture compared to the twenty percent
involved in agriculture in the Reich in 1938.9
This plan also completely ignored Blood and Soil which had been party policy
since 1930 and state policy since 1933. The first major departure from Blood and Soil
was that this new policy completely ignored Darré’s belief that the German peasantry
had to be strengthened from within in order to strengthen German racial stock as a
whole. It also ignored Darré’s belief that a farm should be impartible and passed down
in an organized manner to future generations, so that the peasant and his ancestors
could create a spiritual and racial connection with the land. And lastly, this plan ignored
the idea that a peasant is supposed to be a farmer first and foremost. The Wehrbauer
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concept was, therefore, a complete departure from Darré’s Blood and Soil ideology and
was tangible evidence that the party was abandoning Darré’s philosophy in favor of
Himmler’s.
On October 7, 1939 Heinrich Himmler became the Reich Commissar for the
Strengthening of the German Nation instead of Darré. This new title bestowed upon
Himmler by Führer Decree10 made him the authority in all settlement matters in the
Reich. Himmler’s new responsibilities included:
1. The repatriation of the Reichs- and Volksdeutsche abroad returning home to
the Reich,11
2. The elimination of the harmful influence of non-German sections of the
population who represented a danger to the Reich and the German people,
3. The creation of new German settlement areas for resettlement, in particular
for the Reichs- and Volksdeutsche returning from abroad.12
This decree even had a special condition referring to Darré: “The tasks entrusted to the
Reichsführer-SS are to be carried out by the Reichsminister for Food and Agriculture in
accordance with the general orders of the Reichsführer-SS, as far as the restructuring of
the German peasantry is concerned.”13 Darré had resigned from the RuSHA within the
SS in 1938 due to his disagreement with Himmler regarding peasant policy. He now, one
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year later, found himself once again subordinate to Himmler and also responsible for
implementing Himmler’s peasant and settlement policies. In November 1939 Darré
threatened to resign from his role as Reichsminister due to his dwindling role in the
party’s agricultural policy and Himmler’s selection over Darré as leader in settlement
policy. Helmuth von Groscurth recalled in his diary in November 1939 that:
Ever since the Four-Year Plan gained influence over Nazi peasant policy, there
have been repeated tensions between Göring and Darré. Added to this was his
annoyance at his failure in terms of popular politics. (He had retired from the
management of the RuSHA in 1938.) As Reich Minister he had felt responsible for
the [Eastern Settlement]. Instead, however, Himmler was appointed Reich
Commissar for the Strengthening of the German Nation in October 1939. In
autumn of the same year during a disagreement with Hitler about Secretary
Backe, whose continued employment in the Ministry was expressly demanded,
Darré asked Hitler to bid him farewell, who replied: "Herr Reich Minister, you are
under the law of war and when you go, I choose..." 14
It was clear at this point that Darré was no longer in control of his destiny.
Darré and Himmler’s disintegrating relationship played a key role in Darré’s loss of
power. Himmler had long been Darré’s strongest asset, and by far the most powerful
man with whom Darré had a close relationship. Himmler had even defended Darré from
attacks from other party members as noted in the previous chapter. Darré had not only
lost his closest and most powerful ally, but this former ally was actively competing
against Darré for power with an ideology that differed greatly from Blood and Soil. It
should come as no surprise that Darré would eventually lose this battle. Himmler was
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far too connected, far too powerful, and far more politically apt than Darré. Blood and
Soil was losing traction and was beaten by Himmler’s expansionist ideology.
Had Darré maintained his relationship with Himmler and allowed Himmler to
surpass him in charge of peasant ideology, he likely would have maintained more of his
political power. Had Darré given up on Blood and Soil, and instead took his place as an
administrator who solely administrated the agricultural sector, he could have coexisted
with Himmler despite Himmler’s incursions. This was not who Darré was, however. To
Darré his Blood and Soil ideology and his vision for the German peasantry were more
important than anything else. He had dedicated his entire life since 1928 to bettering
the German peasant through internal policy, and he was not going to be complacent
when someone tried to replace him.
Losing Himmler as an ally was a massive blow to Darré and was made
exponentially worse by the fact that Himmler actively competed against Darré’s peasant
ideology. Darré was stuck in a losing position, unable to resign from office because
Hitler would not allow him and also responsible for enacting someone else’s policies
that went against his own personal ideology. Darré would be stuck in this position for
the next three years as his power dwindled and Himmler’s grew.
Darré, the Peasantry, and Landflucht
The leaders of the NSDAP were not the only people who became disillusioned
with Darré’s ideas and vision for the peasantry, so too did the German peasant.
Agricultural settlement dropped from a record high of 4,931 new farms created in 1934
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down to 846 new farms created in 1939.15 From 1933 to 1938 there were 20,408 new
farms created within the Reich, but over that same period the number of farm laborers
dropped by 513,000.16 In 1939 there were 3.85 million farms in Germany and only
730,262 were Hereditary Farms.17 Overall, the population statistics for the German
farmer were not impressive. Settlement slowed by over eighty percent from 1933 to
1938, Germany lost a half million farmers, and only nineteen percent of German farms
were the racially elite Hereditary Farms. The peasant situation was dire. The Hereditary
Farm Law, while offering some protections, did not solve the problems of the peasantry,
but rather created some unique problems of its own. 18 These peasants were not the
new nobility in the German Reich, and after years of population decline and an
imbalanced planned economy, the peasantry as a whole stagnated economically.
This lack of real growth is evident when comparing the German Gross National
Product (GNP) from 1933 to 1938 against the growth in agricultural value during that
same period. During this period, the German GNP grew from 58.4 billion Reichsmark in
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1933 to 100.2 billion Reichsmark in 1938, or a 71.5 percent growth over that period.19
German agricultural wholesale prices only grew 22 percent. 20 Agricultural economic
growth lagged heavily behind total economic growth. The growth in food prices looked
even less impressive when compared to 1913 prices. On average, the price growth of
German agricultural products was only 5.9 percent over 1913 levels. Some agricultural
products, such as livestock, had not rebounded to 1913 levels by 1938, sitting only at
88.6 percent of 1913 levels. From 1936 to 1937, the wholesale price of German
agricultural goods actually dropped 0.3 percent. In 1938 Herbert Backe and the Office of
the Four Year Plan began to have a bigger effect on the German economy, and from
1938 to 1941 the wholesale prices for agricultural products increased 6.5 percent.
However, German growth was largely exclusive to factory production, such as consumer
goods, where wholesale prices in 1938 were 35.4 percent higher than in 1913.21 Not
only was wholesale growth greater for finished goods compared to agricultural
products, but the ratio of assets to liabilities in these industries was even more lopsided.
In 1935 the agricultural sector in Germany had 183 million reichsmarks in assets and
1,113 million reichsmarks in liabilities for a negative balance of -930 million reichsmarks.
For finished goods production the total assets were 3,859 million reichsmarks with only
746 million reichsmarks in liabilities for a balance of 3,113 million reichsmarks.
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These were the conditions that created and sustained the Landflucht problem. In
order to rescue German agriculture from this situation, massive amounts of money
needed to be funneled into German agriculture. This could occur in the form of
increased wholesale food prices, which would come out of the pockets of workers living
in the cities. But in a country where war was on the horizon, and where heavy industry
needed to run as effectively as possible, this was not going to happen. Therefore,
German peasants left their farms to seek a better life in the cities, where economic
growth and stability were much greater. The imbalance grew even worse with the
approaching war as Germany began funneling billions more into the military sector in
order to fuel its war machine.22
The diary of Ulrich von Hassel23 provides key understanding to just how much
Darré and Blood and Soil’s position with the peasantry degraded over time. In February
1939 von Hassel recalled that a lawyer for Allianz told him that, “Out in the country
things look most discouraging, particularly because of the labor shortage. A peasant had
told him that Darré was seriously beaten up by the peasants at a session of the Bavarian
Peasant Council, after he had answered their practical complaints with stupid
slogans.“24 The German propaganda machine lost its grip on the peasantry. The
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indefinite cancellation by Hitler of the Reich Harvest Festival in 1938 was surely a major
blow for Darré and his image with the peasantry as well. The German peasantry was no
longer being targeted en masse by propaganda and, therefore, began to comprehend
the reality of its poor situation.
The themes of Darré’s speeches also tended away from the Blood and Soil
ideology beginning in 1938. Before 1938 the majority of Darré’s speeches dealt with
Blood and Soil, but after 1938 five of his published speeches were in regard to Blood and
Soil (four in 1938 and one in 1939) and eight were in regard to food policy (four in 1938
and four in 1939). After 1939 none of Darré’s speeches were published.25 Therefore,
Darré attempted to be more practical in his public speaking in 1938 and 1939, but it was
to little effect. By September 1939, Darré and German agriculture were in a poor state.
With the invasion of Poland and beginning of World War II, Darré regained some
stature, but this was inevitably short lived.
I do not believe that Darré’s position with the peasantry could have been
maintained given the circumstances. In order for Blood and Soil to actually succeed, the
full support of the German government was necessary, and this was something that was
highly unlikely. The German peasantry could not be put into a position to become the
leading social group in a society where industry was favored, and war was on the
horizon. Hitler wanted war, and the only role that agriculture played in this scenario was
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food supply. Darré’s internal policy of Blood and Soil could not survive in a country
whose leaders drove it completely toward external conquest.
World War II
Germany invaded Poland shortly before harvest time in 1939. For this reason,
Darré’s first task as war began was to round up enough laborers to secure the Polish
harvest. The amount of Polish farmland was no small matter, totaling almost a fifth of
Germany’s 1937 farmland and consisting of 5000 large farms and hundreds of
thousands of small farms.26 On top of this, German officials wanted Germans, not Poles,
to secure the harvest.
Immediately behind the advancing army, the entire occupied area (including the
present Government General) became dotted with farmers from the Reich, at
first widely distant. It was their task to ensure continued cultivation by all
available means. More agricultural workers to run the derelict estates and
farmsteads were continually being applied for according to the requirements. On
the basis of applications and after examination of the applicant's particulars,
these agricultural workers were summoned to Berlin and sent on their journey to
the areas requesting them. The area south of East Prussia was supplied by the
province of East Prussia in the same way as the area now constituting the
Danzig-West Prussia Gau was supplied by Danzig, whereas the Warthegau, the
district of Kattowitz, and the area now constituting the Government General
were directly supplied by the Reich Food Ministry. A great number of farmers,
required for running the farms, were also taken from the army and from among
the racial Germans on the spot. Almost at the same time, a great number of
tractors, tractor implements, steam plow units, threshing implements, steaming
apparatus and other appliances were shipped to the East for immediate use.27
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Therefore, despite the continued labor shortage that German agriculture had faced for a
number of years, the German government shipped off farm laborers to occupied Poland
to tend to foreign farms. According to a 1940 article in the NS-Landpost by Dr. H. Berger,
the success of this mission was due to the “eagerness to work of thousands of German
farmers, many of whom had temporarily left their own or leased farms in the Reich.” 28
On February 12, 1940 Göring’s Decree Regarding the Public Management of
Agricultural and Forestry Holdings stipulated that all agricultural and forest land in the
occupied Eastern Territories (excluding the Government General) that was not owned
by ethnic Germans was to be put under state control.29 Darré as Minister of Agriculture
was now tasked with creating a body to actually enforce the seizure of land from nonGermans.30 The body created was the East German Land Cultivation Company, Inc,
otherwise known as Ostland, that not only seized lands from non-Germans, but also
tended and cultivated seized farmland. In 1940, Ostland largely continued the work that
Darré began in September 1939, maintaining much of the same land and even
purchasing the equipment that was originally loaned for use in 1939.31 These two events
were the majority of Darré’s actual effect on the war.
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Aside from his role in Poland, Darré had little to no impact on agriculture outside
of Germany for the duration of the war. That role fell to his subordinate and eventual
successor, Herbert Backe. Rather than Darré, Backe was informed of Hitler’s decision to
invade the Soviet Union, and it was Backe who devised Germany’s plan to feed itself and
deal with the unwanted populations in the Soviet Union.32 Backe’s plan was called the
Hunger Plan and had two parts. First, all food in the occupied Eastern Territories would
be diverted to the German military to free up the German food supply to remain for
Germans in the Reich. Second, the plan called for killing off the Jews, Soviet prisoners of
war, and the Slavic populations of Eastern Europe by starvation. All in all, the Hunger
Plan caused the deaths of millions of Eastern Europeans.33
Since Darré was not informed of Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union, he
believed by late 1940 that the war was practically over, and he began to fully turn his
attention back to improving the German peasantry in the Reich.34 Darré believed that
German agriculture could be improved through a form of organic agriculture called
biodynamic agriculture, based on a German mystical philosophy of self-improvement
known as Anthroposophy, created by Rudolf Steiner and grounded in the natural world
and spiritualism. Darré believed that biodynamic agriculture could both increase yields
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by improving soil quality and, therefore, growing efficiency (speed of plant growth and
amount of quality plants grown), and could free German farmers from the need for
synthetic fertilizer.35 From late 1940 to early 1941 Darré sent out a number of
questionnaires to a multitude of different party functionaries ranging from Gauleiters to
leading SS members, and to Hitler himself to gauge their support for biodynamic
agriculture. Hitler did not respond, but twenty-two of the responses to Darré’s
questionnaire exist, and the results were mixed: seven were supportive, three were
unsure, and twelve were unsupportive.
Some of those who supported biodynamic agriculture were Alfred Rosenberg,
Hjalmar Schacht, Heinrich Himmler, and Rudolf Hess. Unfortunately for Darré, only
Himmler and Hess had any real power in 1940, and because of Darré’s falling out with
Himmler, it was unlikely that he would be a stalwart for Darré. The real defender of
Darré and biodynamic agriculture was Rudolf Hess.36 Hess was Hitler’s right-hand man
and a devoted National Socialist since 1920. He was the man that transcribed Part I of
Mein Kampf while Hitler dictated it in Landsberg Prison in 1924. Hess, however, had
attempted to broker peace with the British during a doomed solo flight to Scotland in
May 1941. Following this attempt, Hitler completely rejected Hess.
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The opponents of biodynamic agriculture consisted of men such as Reinhard
Heydrich, head of the Sicherheitsdienst, and the organizer of the death camps, Martin
Bormann, the man who replaced Rudolf Hess as Hitler’s secretary, and Hermann Göring.
Heydrich’s disdain was likely the strongest, however. Peter Staudenmaier writes:
Heydrich depicted anthroposophy as a menacing sect unﬁt for the new
Germany, an elite and foreign belief system committed to its own dubious
dogma. For Heydrich, anthroposophy, and in turn biodynamic agriculture, was
“not a worldview for the whole people, but a special doctrine for a narrow and
limited circle of individuals, a doctrine which endangers National Socialism”.37
Following Hess’ flight, Heydrich issued a declaration called the Action Against Secret
Teachings and so-called Secret Sciences. This was a reactionary measure that led to the
arrest of occultists and mystics in the Reich, which included practitioners of biodynamic
agriculture. There were so many arrests that Darré wrote letters to Heydrich and
Himmler telling them to stop arresting farmers.38 The resistance from the most powerful
men in the Reich never allowed biodynamic agriculture to take off in Germany as Darré
hoped it would.
During the war Darré continued to write and publish articles on German race and
the peasantry. In 1940 Darré released a pair of articles regarding his current peasant
ideology. In the first, “The Law of Life as seen in the Theories of Two States”, Darré
argued that both a strong peasantry and a pure blood line were required to create a
race that would be great throughout the generations. To make his point, Darré
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juxtaposed Ancient China and Sparta. In regard to Sparta, Darré argued that while it
maintained a pure blood line within the aristocracy, the aristocracy abandoned farming
to push for a military based state. Such an aristocracy with no basis in the peasantry
would eventually die off from war and conquest, and without the aristocracy
supplementing itself with peasants, even the state would eventually die off.39 Darré
argued that this was similar to the Prussian system created under Frederick the Great,
but the Prussians supplemented their officer corps with middle and lower class
individuals, and by 1913 two-thirds of the Prussian officer corps was composed of nonnoble citizens.40
Opposite the Spartans were the Ancient Chinese who created a stable state
based on its peasantry. Because of its familial and honorific system “anyone in China
could advance through the political and societal ranks based on ability and
willingness.”41 In Darré’s opinion, China’s method “assured its people eternal life at the
cost of being a shaping force in history.”42 Sparta, on the other hand, created a race that
was great, but died out because it was not “anchored in the Volk.”43 Thus, Darré
believed that for the Germans to create both a great state and one that would last for
generations, a pure blooded nobility based in the peasantry was necessary.
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In another article published in 1940 titled “New Order of Thought”, Darré argued
that German resettlement in the Eastern Territories lost following World War I was an
honorable goal:
It would be ideal if our farms and peasantry could be restored to the soil where
they once sat. It would be such a spiritual experience when grandchildren are
able to approach the graves of their ancestors and commemorate those who
owe their existence to them and who have worked in the fields before them. It
would only be then that the idea of [Blood and Soil] would have its actual
consecration, when the peasant's plow once again broke the soil around the
graves of his ancestors; when the peasant, in memory of his ancestors, could
once again work on his farm and return his ancestry to his soil.44
Darré believed that life ought to revolve around this pseudo-spiritual idea that land and
blood are connected, and that if a family returned to where its ancestors once farmed, a
bond between blood and soil would be rekindled.
Despite Darré’s attempts, it was clear that by 1941 both Germany and the
NSDAP had moved on from Darré and his ideas. Operation Barbarossa began on June
22, 1941, and Germany divided its Eastern Armies into three groups that attacked the
Soviet Union in the north, center, and south. Army Group South was dedicated entirely
to the capture of Ukraine and Crimea. It is clear that the capture of the agriculturally
fertile Ukraine was critical to Hitler, and that he was more interested in advancing
Germany through conquest rather than reshaping the existing German state. Herbert
Backe had convinced the National Socialist leadership that Ukrainian farmland would
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secure the German military’s food supply during World War II.45 For this reason, Hitler
believed firmly that Ukraine was the solution, and nothing that Darré said about the
German peasant would change this. Darré’s Blood and Soil ideology was already being
abandoned, and biodynamic agriculture was illegal. Any possible value of coupling blood
to soil was now completely outweighed by the need to accrue as much food as possible.
In Hitler’s eyes, Backe was the solution to the food question, not Darré.
By mid-1942 Darré’s stock was fairly worthless. As an ideologue whose views
centered on the peasantry but who no longer had its support, and as an agrarian who
had more failures than successes in recent years, Darré was no longer necessary.
Germany was firmly embroiled in a war on multiple fronts, while simultaneously
attempting to starve undesirable populations within the territories it had conquered.
Darré was simply a liability who was wasting other, more important, diplomats’ time by
sending them unnecessary memos about biodynamic agriculture.
Finally, in May 1942 Hitler began to permanently remove Darré from office in
favor of Herbert Backe. Germany faced grain shortages and poor weather. The fear of
having to reduce bread rations in the coming fall was of great concern to Hitler, and this
fear galvanized him into action.46 On May 16, 1942 Hitler stated via Führer Decree that
Darré, “called me regarding his continued health issues to vacate his office as Leiter of
the Reichsamt for Agriculture until further notice.” Hitler then asked Backe, as the
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leading official in the Reichsamt, to take Darré’s place to which he agreed.47 Then, on
May 20, 1942 Hitler spoke with Goebbels regarding Darré and the food situation.
Goebbels recalled:
The Führer has finally decided to let Darré go. Backe will be his replacement. I
urge the Führer not to make a major public action out of it because of the
danger that all mistakes in food policy will be blamed on Darré and in
turn the NSDAP because Darré is after all a National Socialist Minister.
The Führer also agrees and is prepared to publish only that Darré has an
illness which prevents him from exercising his office and that he should
be represented by Backe. Backe performs in an exemplary way. You can
count on him. He is not a pale theorist like Darré, but a true first-class
practitioner. I’ve never thought much of Darré. His theories are pure
literature; he does not understand much about practical agricultural life.
His slogan of blood and soil has been ridden to death by him and his
backers, so that today you couldn’t lure a dog out of an oven with it.48
On May 23, 1942 Goebbels had the newspapers report that Darré was taking a leave of
absence from his position as Reichsminister due to health issues and that Backe would
be filling in for Darré.49 These of course were lies. Darré was not sick, and he did not
vacate his positions willingly, but rather was forced out of his positions by Hitler. Darré
lost his positions as Reichsleiter and Reichsminister within a week; he no longer had any
power whatsoever, and German agriculture was completely out of his hands.
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Darré’s Life After Power
Following Darré’s removal from his positions as Reichsminister and Reichsleiter
in May 1942, Germany led an unsuccessful military campaign into southern Russia and
northeastern Africa. After key surrenders at El Alamein and Stalingrad the German war
machine never regained the traction it had from 1939 to the end 1941. Once the
Western Front was reopened on continental Europe following the D-Day invasions in
June 1944, Germany’s defeat seemed increasingly certain.
Darré lived in relative obscurity from May 1942 to the end of the war in Europe
in the spring of 1945. He continued to be involved in government correspondence in
1942 and 1943, and maintained an office in Berlin until 1944.50 In March 1943 Darré was
exposed alongside multiple other NSDAP members for purchasing food without ration
coupons.51 In 1944, Darré’s Berlin house was destroyed by an allied bomb and he, his
wife, and daughter moved to a new house outside Berlin.52 According to Darré’s diary,
he ran into Backe in a Berlin air raid shelter in mid-April 1945 and told Backe that his
own [Darré’s] opposition to the war was justified.53 On April 14, 1945 Darré surrendered
to the American forces in Thuringia.
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From 1947 to 1949 Darré, among other German officials, was put on trial by the
American Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in what came to be known as the Ministries
Trial. Defendants in the Ministries Trial faced the following possible charges:
1. Planning, Preparation, Initiation, and Waging of Wars of Aggression and
Invasions of Other Countries
2. Common Plan and Conspiracy
3. War Crimes: Murder and Ill-Treatment of Belligerents and Prisoners of
War
4. Crimes against Humanity: Atrocities and Offenses Committed against
German Nationals on Political, Racial, and Religious Grounds from 1933
to 1939
5. War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Atrocities and Offenses
Committed against Civilian Populations
6. War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Plunder and Spoliation
7. War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Slave Labor
8. Membership in Criminal Organizations

Darré was charged with counts 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8. After a year-and-a-half of trials for the
twenty-one defendants, sentences were passed down on April 13, 1949. Darré was
acquitted of counts 1, 2, and 7 but found guilty of counts 5, 6, and 8. Darré was found
guilty of count five due to his discriminatory policies toward German Jews in regard to
food and land policy54 and because of his role in removing the native populations from
their land during and after the invasion of Poland.55 Darré was found guilty of count six
due to the Reich Ministry’s role in implementing the Hunger Plan.56 Lastly, Darré was
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partially acquitted of count eight due to his attempt to resign from the SS, but was still
found guilty due to being a Reichsleiter.57 Darré was sentenced to seven years’
imprisonment for his crimes, crediting time already served; therefore, Darré’s sentence
ran from 1945 to 1952.
Darré was imprisoned in Landsberg Prison, the same prison that housed Adolf
Hitler in 1924 after the failed Munich Beer Hall Putsch. Darré was released from prison
in August 1950 due to his failing health. He spent his final years in Bad Harzburg near
what Darré had dubbed the Reich Peasant City, Goslar, nearly two decades earlier. On
September 5, 1953 Darré died in a Munich clinic from liver cancer.
Summary
Three major circumstances made sure that Darré would not survive as a highranking German official after 1938. First, the importance of other high-ranking officials
to maintaining Darré in power was proven after he lost his two most powerful allies:
Heinrich Himmler and Rudolf Hess. Himmler had originally been a proponent of Darré’s
peasant ideology, Blood and Soil. Himmler also helped launch Darré’s political career by
making him a leader in the Schutzstaffel in 1932, and defended Darré multiple times
when his power was challenged. After 1938, however, Himmler replaced Darré as the
leader in peasant policy and pushed for peasant policy based on conquest, rather than
Blood and Soil. Rudolf Hess defended Darré later in his career when Darré began trying
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to infuse Biodynamic Agriculture into Blood and Soil as a means of freeing all German
farmers from using synthetic fertilizer in favor of a more natural and spiritual farming
method. After Hess was captured by the Allies, Darré was completely vulnerable to all
attacks from his detractors, such as Heydrich, Göring, and Bormann.
Landflucht was another massive issue for Darré because he could not promote a
peasant ideology with no peasantry to apply it to. Economic favoritism for urban
workers and poor leadership on Darré’s part helped create the Landflucht problem that
continued even after Darré was removed from office in 1942. Blood and Soil was an
ideology that could only thrive with the entire power of a government behind it. The
mass amount of resources that had to be funneled into the peasantry in order to groom
it into the superior state that Darré wanted while still maintaining Germany’s industrial
capacity made the implementation of Blood and Soil highly unlikely. The entire German
agricultural sector was deeply in debt, and in order to bring it out of debt, agricultural
wholesale prices would have had to be increased, which would in turn hinder the
industrial sector and hurt those living in cities. This was not the route that Hitler and the
NSDAP wanted to take and Darré, the peasantry, and Blood and Soil became secondary
or worse. By 1939 a large number of peasants had realized that Darré was not going to
deliver on the promises of Blood and Soil and they began to reject him as well. With no
support from the top or bottom, Darré was destined to fail.
The death knell for Darré was the long war. Darré may have survived as a
minister had the war ended in 1940 after the fall of the countries that surrounded
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Germany, but after Germany failed to defeat the Soviets in the second half of 1941 and
food supplies became an immediate concern, Darré was removed from office. Darré
played a role in the war in Poland in 1939 and helped organize the effort to secure the
Polish harvest and administer confiscated land in Poland. After this, however, Darré was
hardly involved in the war and was replaced by Herbert Backe. The actual plans for
agricultural expansion on the Eastern Front were the responsibilities of Herbert Backe,
which signaled that Darré was irrelevant regarding both agricultural and peasant
matters. The only thing that really held Darré in his position until May 1942 was that he
was a National Socialist minister. That his dismissal was coming, however, was signaled
as Hitler, Goebbels, and Himmler all expressed concerns prior to May 1942 as to what
sort of message removing Darré from office would send to the public.
The existing historiography fails to fully appreciate the role that his Blood and
Soil ideology played in his removal. Collingham has argued that Darré was removed
from power to “revitalize the war effort,” but this was not fully the case. He had little
real power in the war economy because Himmler and Backe already overshadowed him
in the agricultural sector from 1939 to 1942.58 The removal of Darré in 1942 simply
precluded him from bothering other officials regarding Blood and Soil and allowed
Backe to have the full use of the official channels that were afforded to Darré as
Reichsminister and Reichsleiter. Tooze has argued that Darré was removed from power
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due to a disastrous ration cut. Instead, it was the fear of having to cut rations that
galvanized Hitler into action. Therefore, this fear was a catalyst for removing Darré from
office, but not the cause. Farquharson has argued that Darré was removed from power
because of his unwillingness to further exploit the unwanted populations in the East
after Operation Barbarossa in June 1941. This, however, continued after the invasion of
the Soviet Union under the watch of Backe and his Hunger Plan, and there was nothing
that Darré could even really do about it had he wanted to. The notion shared by a
number of historians (such as Evans, Kershaw, Bramwell, and Tooze) that Hitler did not
want to remove Darré from office because of his reluctance to discard ministers is, in my
judgement, inaccurate. Darré had been a Reichsminister for almost nine years when he
was removed from office, whereas the average tenure for a Reichsminister was less
than six years; Darré had also been a Reichsleiter for nine years (three years as a Leiter
and six years as a Reichsleiter after his office was promoted in the party hierarchy) and
the average tenure was just short of eleven years, though this average is skewed by
people who had been Reichsleiters since the 1920s. Therefore, Hitler was not opposed
to removing high-ranking officials when necessary. Lastly, Anna Bramwell, has argued
that Darré was an honorable and misunderstood man who was mixed in with a group of
dishonorable men. According to Bramwell, Darré was not an anti-Semite, his ideas were
sound, and his failures were not his fault. In my opinion, Bramwell is off the mark. She
does not actually focus on why Darré came to power, remained in power, and was
eventually removed from power. Instead, Bramwell devotes much of her book to
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arguing that Darré was one of the original green politicians and that he was a trailblazer
of his time, neglecting to point out that Darré was a failed administrator, his plans were
impractical, and that his personality pushed people away and kept him from further
achieving his political goals.
The reality of the matter is that Darré maintained power because Blood and Soil
maintained importance until at least 1938/1939. Before the war began and while
Germany pursued an internal policy of nation building, Blood and Soil was an attractive
idea that appealed to a sizeable minority of the German population. The year before the
war began, however, Darré resigned from the RuSHA due to a disagreement in peasant
policy with Heinrich Himmler. It was at this point that marginalization efforts against
Darré picked up steam. When the war began Darré maintained some importance
because his RNS could be mobilized to secure the Polish harvest and improve the
German food situation. When the invasion of the Soviet Union began, however, German
policy shifted to imperialism, which was not part of Darré’s ideology. The shift was then
made to completely remove Darré and his ideology because they did not comply with
the new direction in which Hitler had decided to lead Germany.
Overall, Blood and Soil failed because of a lack of support on all fronts. It lacked
political support from other ministers because of economic favoritism toward urban
workers and after 1939 the push towards imperialism, it lacked support from Darré
since he was so busy trying to coordinate the agricultural, economic, and social policy
for the German agricultural sector, and lastly, it lacked the support of the peasantry,
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since they had been marginalized economically and politically since 1936. Blood and Soil
was so ambitious that it required support on all of these fronts, and when it did have
this support from 1933 to 1935 it was somewhat successful. When it started losing
support, however, it was doomed. Something as massive as Blood and Soil simply could
not succeed without overwhelming and continued support of the entire German
government.
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CHAPTER 3

This chapter examines how Hitler went about removing officials from power. I
will answer three main questions. Why did the NSDAP remove officials from power?
How did the NSDAP go about removing officials from power? And, was there any policy
that the NSDAP followed to make these decisions? I will discuss six officials, split into
three groups. Gregor Strasser and Ernst Rohm will be in the first group - betrayal or
treason. Rudolf Hess and Werner von Blomberg will be in the second group - scandal
and party image. Lastly, Hans Kerrl and Wilhelm Frick will be in the third group ineffectiveness, incompetence, and other reasons for dismissal. In all of these cases, the
consolidation of power within a small inner circle of Hitler loyalists was an important
result. In each of these groups I will examine why these officials were removed from
power and how the NSDAP went about removing them. Afterward, I will examine
Darré’s place within the context of NSDAP personnel policy.
NSDAP Personnel Policy
Hitler stated in Mein Kampf what he believed the basic premise of NSDAP
personnel policy should be:
Hence it is the highest task of the organization to make sure that no inner
disunities within the membership of the movement lead to a split and hence a
weakening of the movement’s work; further, that a spirit of determined attack
does not die out, but is continuously renewed and reinforced. The number of
members need not grow infinitely; on the contrary: since only a small fraction of
mankind is by nature energetic and bold, a movement which endlessly enlarges
its organization would inevitably be weakened someday as a result.
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Organizations, in other words, membership figures, which grow beyond a certain
level gradually lose their fighting power and are no longer capable of supporting
or utilizing the propaganda of an idea resolutely and aggressively. 59
Therefore, for Hitler, the number one factor in personnel decisions is how they will
affect the strength of the party. The party is strongest when it has a few completely
dedicated members, and this is the state to which the party returned as time went on.
Hitler did not limit enrollment into the party, but rather made it so only a few party
members had any real power. This is why officials such as Heinrich Himmler and
Hermann Göring would amass titles and responsibilities after 1941.60 Hitler tried to
centralize the power in the party and the Reich in the hands of his most dedicated
officials’. The personnel policy of the NSDAP was to protect the strength of the party at
all costs and to consolidate the party’s power into a few officials’ hands. This idea was
further elaborated in Robert Ley’s 1937 Organisationsbuch der NSDAP, where he wrote
that, “expulsion is the highest penalty the party can assign” and “in addition to their
membership, [they] also automatically lose their possible leadership positions,
workplace in the party and all its organizations, and all honorary posts in the state and
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in the communities,” and “it is generally appropriate that those who have left the
movement are also thrown out of their private jobs.”61 Ley states three main reasons for
expulsion: slander, contravening party efforts, and immoral behavior that damages the
party.62
Another tool for implementing NSDAP personnel policy were the direct oaths of
fealty that Hitler required be sworn to him. Different organizations required different
oaths, which carried different obligations and responsibilities. Refusal to take the oath
could lead to loss of positions, lack of access to organizations or imprisonment.63
Members of the Wehrmacht were required to state:
I swear this holy oath to God that I should unconditionally obey the leader of the
German Reich and the people, Adolf Hitler, the Supreme Commander of the
Wehrmacht, and that I, as a brave soldier, should be ready to commit my life to
this oath at any time.64
Members of the SS swore to this oath:
I swear to you, Adolf Hitler, as leader and chancellor of the German Reich loyalty
and bravery. We vow obedience to you and your chosen leaders until death. So
help me God!65
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Lastly, members of the civil service (both party and state) were required to repeat this
oath:
I swear: I will be loyal and obedient to the leader of the German Reich and
people, Adolf Hitler, observe the laws and conscientiously fulfill my official
duties, so God help me.66
Therefore, fealty to Adolf Hitler and maintaining the image of the party were two
important duties for any civil servant or party official. In the following section I will
further describe the party’s personnel policy and discuss three main reasons why
officials were removed from power.
Betrayal or Treason
Ernst Roehm and Gregor Strasser were two early National Socialists who were
critical to the success of the NSDAP leading up to the Machtergreifung. They both also
betrayed Adolf Hitler. Betrayal of the Führer carried the penalty of death. Execution was
used to remove powerful political opponents from power and to end an immediate
threat to the Führer and party’s power. Their executions served as an immediate means
to an end, a deterrent, and with the proper propaganda would be skewed to make the
party look justified in the killings.
Ernst Roehm was the leader of the Sturmabteilung, the NSDAP’s paramilitary
wing, from 1931 to 1934. Roehm was an officer in the Reichswehr and helped provide
the NSDAP with arms during the failed Beer Hall Putsch. While Hitler was in prison
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Roehm continued his paramilitary activities but quit all political activity from 1925 to
1931 due to disagreements with Hitler regarding the party’s paramilitary policies. 67
Gregor Strasser was one of the leading members of the NSDAP in the 1920s. He
was a member of the northern faction of the NSDAP and was the gateway to Goebbels
entrance into the party’s upper ranks. Strasser and Goebbels helped create the NSDAP’s
propaganda machine; Strasser was the Reichspropagandaleiter from 1926 to 1929 and
Goebbels held the same position from 1929 to 1945.68 Strasser was the Gauleiter of
Munich and Bayreuth from 1925 to 1929. Strasser and Hitler had repeated tensions, and
these tensions worsened exponentially after September 1932.69
Both of these men were executed by the NSDAP during the Night of Long Knives
on June 30, 1934. Goebbels justified the killings in a July 1, 1934 diary entry, noting that
Roehm, Francois-Poncet, Schleicher, and Strasser were conspiring against the Führer,
and that the Führer and his supporters decided on June 29th that the rebels would soon
act and that they must strike pre-emptively “with blood” to quell the rebellion. 70 The
next day both Roehm and Strasser were arrested and killed. Alfred Rosenberg justified
their killings in his diary, arguing that the Führer did not want them to be shot, but they
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were both guilty of treason.71 Viktor Klemperer, a German Jew who kept detailed diaries
and often spoke on the political climate in the Reich, wrote in his diary about the
killings, stating:
No sympathy at all for the vanquished, only delight, (a) that they are eating one
another up, (b) that Hitler is now like a man after his first major heart attack.
Admittedly I was depressed when everything remained calm during the days that
followed. But then we told ourselves: They cannot survive this blow.72
It was clear that Hitler and the NSDAP knew what they were doing when they executed
those who challenged them, and that they certainly could survive it.
Treason was the most serious crime one could commit in the Reich. On July 20,
1944 Claus von Stauffenberg attempted to assassinate Adolf Hitler and overthrow the
National Socialist government. He failed to kill Hitler and the coup was quickly
squashed. In retaliation, 4980 people were executed, including a number of noteworthy
officials, such as: Ludwig Beck, Erwin Rommel, Erwin von Witzleben, and Carl Friedrich
von Goerdeler.
Treason, betrayal or other challenges to the Führer’s power carried the penalty
of death. Such deaths accomplished two things: the immediate cessation of the
supposed treasonous activities against the Führer and party, and the setting of an
example to other people who may attempt to challenge the Führer. Execution was
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extremely effective when used, and propaganda masterminds such as Joseph Goebbels
were geniuses at spinning the story to make the NSDAP appear justified.
Scandal and Party Image
As stated by both Hitler and Robert Ley, maintaining party image was of the
utmost importance. Therefore, scandals which could damage the party image or bring
unwanted attention to party members and their affairs required immediate action
against the guilty person. Scandals could be leveraged against a person in the public eye
or in private, and they could be created by the NSDAP or come out through various
news outlets. The NSDAP took advantage of scandal to distance itself from an individual,
and to separate its ideology and preserve the party’s character as much as possible. The
individual details of the specific scandal were often kept secret or skewed in order to
protect the individual. Because of the way that the NSDAP dealt with scandal it was
generally able to maintain the character of an individual and their past
accomplishments, while still distancing itself from their scandal. The cases of General
Werner von Blomberg and Rudolf Hess are very different but exemplify this approach.
General Werner von Blomberg was the Reichsminister of War in the Hitler
cabinet from 1933 to 1938.73 Blomberg largely oversaw the reorganization of the
German military from 1935 to 1938 and helped reign in the Army General Staff under
the control of Hitler and the Government. In 1938 Blomberg married a much younger
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wife, and multiple high-ranking officials, including Hermann Göring and Adolf Hitler,
were present at the wedding.74 After the wedding, Göring confronted both Wilhelm von
Fritsch and Hitler with a report, stating that Blomberg’s new wife had posed for
pornographic photos in 1932 and that her mother had a lengthy criminal record. Hitler
argued that Blomberg should annul the marriage, Blomberg refused and resigned his
post as Reichsminister of War on January 27, 1938.75 Shortly after this, General Wilhelm
von Fritsch, another army officer and possible replacement for Blomberg, had
allegations of homosexuality raised against him, and he also resigned his post on
February 4, 1938.76 Hitler used these events to completely reorganize and further
subjugate the German military. Hitler had the Ministry of War dissolved and replaced by
the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht headed by the completely loyal Wilhelm Keitel.77
Rudolf Hess was a close associate of Adolf Hitler who flew in the night on May
10, 1941 to Scotland to try and broker peace with the British. Hess secretly planned his
flight for five months, and the party leadership did not even learn of his flight until the
British press reported his capture.78 Rosenberg wrote in his diary that Hess was a man
who had been slowly marginalized over the years. This loss of influence, Rosenberg
claimed, drove Hess into depression and madness, and this flight to Scotland was simply
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the peak of Hess’ madness.79 Joseph Goebbels discussed the political effects of Hess’
flight to Scotland in his diary. In his diary entries from the seven days following Hess’
flight, Goebbels described the incident as: a complete mess, terrible, losing dramatic
character, and finally fading.80 Goebbels wrote on May 16, 1941:
Extent of atrocity still enormous, substance very low. In the whole presentation
no clear tendency. The rumors are killing each other dead. I see it as a great
relief for us. Apparently, London does not come up with an obvious twist, simply
handing out statements regarding Hess without concern. That would be the only,
but also terrible, danger for us. I tremble at the thought that this could happen.
But it seems like a guardian angel is standing next to us again.81
Viktor Klemperer also described this event in his diary:
Hess Affair (Deputy of the Führer, to England in a plane), three days ago on the
radio, as we were sitting in the Pschorr, the day before yesterday confused
“explanation”, now not a word, appears to have caused a great sensation among
the whole population. Should one place any hopes in it? In my war diaries I come
upon facts that I only allude to, because they seemed to me so incredibly
momentous and imprinted on me forever—and today I no longer know what
they were about, they were unimportant after all and slipped away. Will it be the
same with Hess?82
Though this problem seemingly solved itself with little spin by Goebbels, Hitler still took
the opportunity to dissolve Hess’ previous post of Deputy-Führer and had it replaced by
the Chief of the Party Chancellery.
When scandals arose, the NSDAP protected itself by threatening someone to
resign. A scandal could weaken the party and bring into question its integrity and quality
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of its membership; therefore, to maintain maximum power, it was necessary for the
NSDAP to remove any officials that were affected by scandal.
Ineffectiveness, Incompetence, and other Reasons
Ministers who were ineffective, incompetent, who outlived their usefulness, or
who attempted to do more than their position required were often marginalized or
removed from office. As this occurred, the NSDAP consolidated power under fewer
officials. Wilhelm Frick and Hans Kerrl were two National Socialist Reichsministers who
were removed from office under these circumstances. The NSDAP usually used a
process of marginalization, which was a slow process that allowed it to remove
someone from office over a longer period of time with little negative effect on party
image. These marginalized officials did nothing necessarily wrong, and they were not a
threat to the party or Hitler, but their removal was deemed necessary, nonetheless.
Wilhelm Frick was a long time National Socialist who took part in the failed Beer
Hall Putsch. Frick was one of the first National Socialists to hold legitimate government
positions when he became the Minister of Education and Interior for Thuringia in 1930.
When Hitler was appointed Chancellor in 1933, Wilhelm Frick became Reichsminister
that year and was the only man besides Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk to be a
Reichsminister for the entirety of the Hitler Cabinet. Frick was extremely important to
the NSDAP from 1933 to 1936, drafting many of the state’s most well-known laws, such
as the Nuremberg Race Laws and laws related to rearmament. Much like Darré, Frick’s
power was usurped by Heinrich Himmler for Himmler’s own personal gain.
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Unlike Darré, however, Frick was actually replaced in his position as
Reichsminister of the Interior by Heinrich Himmler, and Frick was allowed to stay in the
cabinet as a Reichsminister Without Portfolio. Frick had unsuccessfully tried multiple
times from 1933 to 1938 to limit Himmler and the Schutzstaffel’s power. Eventually in
1938 Himmler was named Chief of the German Police which, effectively moved control
of the police from the Ministry of the Interior to Himmler’s SS. On April 6, 1943
Goebbels wrote in his diary that he had had a conversation with Josef Terboven, and
that many of the issues in the Reich were due to issues within the central leadership.
Furthermore, Terboven suggested, which Goebbels had long believed, that Himmler
should replace Frick as the Reichsminister of the Interior.83 Himmler took Frick’s place as
Reichsminister of the interior four months later in August 1943. Victor Klemperer
viewed Himmler’s appointment as Reichsminister of the Interior as a bad omen, “How
must matters stand in Germany, if the hangman is made minister of the interior!”84 Frick
maintained some power, as he was transferred to Prague to become the Protector of
Bohemia and Moravia. Frick maintained this position until the city surrendered to the
allies in May 1945.
Hanns Kerrl was the Reichsminister for Church Affairs from July 1935 until
December 1941. Kerrl was originally made a Reichsminister Without Portfolio in June
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1934 but was promoted to Reichsminister of the newly created Church Affairs Office.
Kerrl was in an extremely difficult position because it was his job to bring the churches
in Germany under the influence of the NSDAP, while several other German officials,
such as Rosenberg and Himmler, openly spoke ill of Christianity.85 Alfred Rosenberg was
especially unfond of Kerrl, and after 1936 wrote often about Kerrl’s failures and how,
despite his best attempts, he often worked against the Führer’s wishes rather than
towards them.86 Kerrl died in office in December 1941. A man who had accomplished
little and left little to no impact on National Socialism was joked about by Hitler and
Rosenberg following his death.87 Hitler argued, “Kerrl’s motives surely were nothing but
noble, but the endeavor to unite National Socialism and Christianity was simply a
hopeless one.”88 Kerrl was replaced by another powerless minister who also
accomplished little. Kerrl was in the unique position where his entire office was
effectively marginalized rather than simply himself.
Neither Frick nor Kerrl had necessarily done anything wrong. Frick was an
essential member in the NSDAP’s path to legal power and helped implement
Gleichschaltung. His issue, however, was that he attempted to maintain control of the
police in the Ministry of the Interior and, in turn, limit Himmler’s power. He was slowly
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marginalized until he lost his position as Reichsminister of the Interior, though he
maintained some power in a different form. Kerrl on the other hand embarked on an
impossible task, to merge Christianity with National Socialism. In a society where
Christianity was openly criticized and occultism was practiced by many prominent party
members, this was an impossible feat, and Kerrl was stuck in the middle, incapable of
accomplishing anything. He maintained his position, but lost all power.
Darré in the Broader Context of Personnel Matters
Darré did not betray the Reich, and there were no real character issues that the
NSDAP could use against him aside from purchasing food without ration coupons.
Rather, Darré was marginalized and removed from power because he was ineffective,
outlived his usefulness, and attempted to do more than his position required. This
process began in 1936 when Backe was made head of agriculture within the Office of
the Four Year Plan and became irreversible following Darré’s resignation from RuSHA.
He faced further marginalization as Backe continued to gain favor and amass power.
Darré continued to lose power as Himmler was made the Reich Commissar for the
Strengthening of the German Nation in 1939 and, in turn, became the de facto leader in
peasant policy. When the war began in 1939 Darré found some favor again, as the RNS
was the body deemed responsible for securing and administrating Polish farmland, but
this was short lived as Backe became the ruthless administrator who crafted the
agricultural policy in Eastern Europe known as the Hunger Plan. Darré found himself
continuously more marginalized until 1942, when he was removed from power by Adolf
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Hitler. Darré was a longstanding National Socialist minister who played an important
role in bringing the NSDAP to power, like his contemporary Wilhelm Frick. Unlike Frick,
however, Darré was far more committed to his ideals and policies which led to his
complete loss of power, rather than a move to a different position. Darré was not a
danger to National Socialism, just a bother to its leadership.
Summary
Treason, betrayal, scandal, the preservation of party image, ineffectiveness, and
incompetence were the main reasons that officials were removed from power during
the Third Reich. However, as the Eastern and Western fronts continued to converge on
Germany from 1944 to 1945, and Germany’s fate became more apparent, treason
became prominent and execution became more common as the NSDAP tried to
maintain control over the state and nation. Before 1944 removals from power were
more nuanced as actions were weighed more to decide how the NSDAP would deal with
the “guilty” party. These actions could range from execution due to treason or
marginalization due to ineffective leadership. It is clear that it had long been Hitler’s
plan to keep the NSDAP as an exclusive organization, only open to the most dedicated
members. Despite membership figures being in the millions in 1945, the real members,
Hitler’s inner circle, remained small and consistent: Goebbels, Himmler, Speer, Göring,
and Rosenberg. These were the men who really held power or influence, and these
were the men who helped Hitler run the Reich. Outside of these men, Hitler’s larger
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circle89 did not change much over Hitler’s tenure as Führer and Chancellor either. A
small and totally dedicated force is what Hitler wanted, and that is largely what he and
his personnel policy were able to create.
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CONCLUSION

In this thesis I investigated how Darré’s Blood and Soil ideology fueled both his
rise and fall from power between 1930 and 1942. My research, I believe, builds on the
existing historiography on National Socialism on two specific points: first, the role that
Darré’s Blood and Soil ideology played in his demise from 1938 to 1942; and second, the
personnel policy of the NSDAP and how Hitler and the NSDAP made decisions regarding
the removal of high ranking officials.
The first chapter regarding Darré’s rise to power laid the basis for the following
two chapters which discussed Darré’s removal from power and the personnel policy of
the NSDAP. In this first chapter, I explained how Darré’s racist and peasant-centric Blood
and Soil ideology was attractive to the German peasantry, a large social group that was
ignored by other political parties. This popularity helped bring Hitler to power in 1933,
and later that same year Darré was awarded with a promotion to Reichsminister. I
explained how Darré quickly passed legislation aligned with his Blood and Soil ideology
to help nurture, promote, and protect the peasantry. Darré, however, was unable to
provide positive results on the agricultural front, and in 1936 his deputy, Herbert Backe,
was placed in charge of a rival agricultural organization under Hermann Göring.
The second chapter, I believe, adds significantly to the existing historiography on
Darré, which does not properly explain his loss of power, and the role that his Blood and
Soil ideology played in his demise. In 1938, when Darré split with Heinrich Himmler, he
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irreversibly damaged his political safety net, and faced ever increasing encroachment on
his personal power. It was between 1938 and 1942 that the impracticality of Blood and
Soil became apparent. A peasant based German state would lead to the stagnation of
German industrial society which would directly impact Hitler’s ability to prepare for war.
It would also require a massive influx of economic and human capital into the
countryside to repopulate the agricultural landscape, which had been steadily
decreasing in population for most of the decade. The massive effort that it would take
to make Blood and Soil a reality is what made it a slogan rather than party policy in the
late 1930s. In 1939 Himmler replaced Darré in peasant policy when he became the Reich
Commissar for the Strengthening of the German Nation. In 1939, World War II started,
and Hitler and the leadership of the NSDAP moved on from internal nation building to
conquest. This effectively killed Blood and Soil, a policy that was intrinsically inward
facing and focused on bettering the nation through internal rebirth and rejuvenation.
Despite Darré’s efforts he was removed from power in 1942 so that his former deputy
Herbert Backe could have full control of the German agricultural apparatus to pursue a
policy of raping the Soviet population of the entirety of its agricultural stores to feed
Germany and its people. Afterwards, Darré lived in obscurity until the end of the war
when he was arrested by the Allies. Darré stood trial and was found guilty for his crimes.
The second chapter brought clarity to the issue of why Darré was removed from
power, and the role that his Blood and Soil ideology played in his removal. There is no
consensus in the existing historiography on this point and it is often glossed over as a
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minor detail. Darré’s Blood and Soil ideology, however, being both the cause for his rise
and fall is a major issue, and one that requires closer examination. Although Blood and
Soil may never have been a major goal for Hitler, the ideology received significant
attention in the early to mid-1930s, so much so that major legislation was passed in
order to protect the peasantry and help create the separate social group, Hereditary
Farmers. This same ideology that received such great attention during the early years of
the Third Reich was abandoned by the NSDAP beginning in 1938. Darré’s attempts to
continue to push his personal ideology is what led to his split with Heinrich Himmler and
his eventual replacement by Himmler as the head of German peasant policy. As Darré
continued to push his ideology during the war years he was completely replaced
administratively by Backe and was forced into obscurity. This point is critical in
understanding Darré and is something that was not yet covered properly in the existing
historiography.
The third chapter discussed NSDAP personnel policy and also added significantly
to the existing historiography. The questions of why and how the NSDAP removed
officials from power during the Third Reich has not been something at the forefront of
the historiography of the Third Reich. It has been touched on briefly by some historians
but is generally boiled down to Hitler wanting to save face and preserve the leadership
of the NSDAP. Hitler did remove ministers and other high ranking officials from power,
however, and this chapter explained why and how these removals were carried out.
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I divided the reasons for removal into three groups: treason and betrayal,
scandal and the preservation of party image, and ineffectiveness and incompetence.
Using these groupings, I explained why and how these issues affected the party and also
how the NSDAP went about then removing officials from power. I found explanations
for the reasons and methods of removals in both Mein Kampf and the
Organisationsbuch der NSDAP and by examining similarities and differences in the
removal of multiple officials from power. Darré fell into the last group, ineffectiveness,
and my research showed how Darré’s career had led to that removal. Darré, despite
being effective at first, very quickly displayed his inability to administer German
agriculture. As Darré’s ideology continued to deviate from the path that Hitler wanted
the country to follow and other officials proved themselves more capable of carrying
out the duties for which Darré was responsible, Darré was removed from power in 1942.
Darré’s duties were consolidated under two other existing officials: Herbert Backe and
Heinrich Himmler.
This thesis provides critical insight into the career of a major contributor to the
NSDAP’s ideology and its rise to power. It shows how Darré’s contributions both helped
him rise to power, but also played a key role in his eventual loss of power. Darré stood
at the highest echelon of German political society in the mid-1930s; he was friends with
close allies of Hitler such as Rudolf Hess, Heinrich Himmler, and Alfred Rosenberg. As
Germany moved towards militarization and further industrialization, however, Darré
continued to fight for his own ideology. This was a fruitless endeavor, and as Darré
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failed as an administrator, he had little ground to stand on. Darré’s continued push for a
German peasant based society, rather than an agricultural sector based on conquest led
to his replacement in peasant matters by Heinrich Himmler. Darré’s failures in
agriculture, including his focus on the continued improvement of existing German
farming, and his inability to create a policy that Hitler deemed effective for feeding the
German military during war, led to his eventual replacement by Herbert Backe as the
leader of agricultural policy. Darré’s total commitment to Blood and Soil was what cost
him his position. Blood and Soil was not important during the war, and Darré’s inability
to shelve his ideology to face the realities of the total war that Germany had launched in
Europe cemented his removal from power. During the war, Darré and his ideology
became more of a liability than an advantage, and because of this he lost everything. As
Darré lived in obscurity from 1942 to 1945 he witnessed Germany’s total destruction. As
the Soviet Union poured through the eastern borders of the Reich, Darré watched
Germany lose most of its agricultural land, and with it any possibility of Blood and Soil
taking hold in the future.
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